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“O, it is excellent to have a giant’s strength: but it is tyrannous to use it as a giant.” 
(William Shakespeare in Measure for Measure) 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Patents have long since become one of the most important assets of a 
company. Such intangible, intellectual assets are often worth more than 
traditional physical property.1 One need only to think of large 
pharmaceutical companies that invest immense amounts of time and 
money into research and development of new drugs, and then can protect 
their research achievements and their position at the knowledge front with 
patents guaranteeing them years of exclusive use of their new 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
Other companies as well, such as Apple, for instance, live off their 
intellectual property rights, be it patents that guarantee them economic 
exploitation of technological progress or trademark rights that protect their 
hard-won reputation and image of Apple from imitation and exploitation of 
reputation. According to the magazine Forbes the brand Apple alone is 
worth about 105 billion US Dollars.2 This is equivalent to 20 % of Apples 
entire stock exchange value.3 
 
Since patents grant the patent holder – for a limited period of time - 
an exclusive right of use of the protected technology and products, they 
are often designated as monopoly rights.4 However, the term “monopoly” 
                                                             
1 Hall, Brownwyn H. “The Use and Value of IP Rights” (2009) p. 15 available at: 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH09_IPMinisterial_June.pdf. 
2 See http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/11/06/apple-dominates-list-of-
the-worlds-most-valuable-brands/. 
3 See http://www.marketwatch.com/story/apple-is-now-a-value-stock-2013-10-23. 
4 Duffy, John F. “Intellectual Property as Natural Monopoly: Toward a General Theory of 
Partial Property Rights “ (2005) available at: http://www.utexas.edu/law/wp/wp-
content/uploads/centers/clbe/duffy_intellectual_property_natural_monopoly.pdf. 
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has often a slightly bitter taste because it creates the idea that a monopoly 
grants effortless profits made possible not due to achievement, but due to 
exclusion of competition.5  
 
It is not a coincidence that the establishment of patent rights is 
related to the Statute of Monopolies from 16246, which put an end to the 
fund raising of the British monarchs by granting monopolies, arbitrarily 
limiting their power to the granting of patents to the real and first inventors 
of new products and their production methods.7  
 
Later, the inventors' rights were recognised in the first modern 
constitutions, which were influenced by the Enlightenment.8 The growing 
enforcement of patent rights in the 19th century in Europe was 
accompanied by a fierce patent battle, in which the competitiveness of 
particular national industries played a decisive role.9 In Germany, for 
instance, Werner von Siemens10 acted as an eminent inventor-
enterpreneur, who played a large role in the final success of the pro-patent 
movement.11  
 
                                                             
5 Teschemacher, Rudolf “Patentschutz und Marktmacht“ (Buchbesprechung) (2012) 
GRURInt. p. 695. 
6 The Statute of Monopolies is considered as the first English codified patent law.See: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3. 
7  Thorley, Simon and others Terrell on the Laws of Patents (2000) p. 4, 13; 
Teschemacher, Rudolf “Patentschutz und Marktmacht“ (Buchbesprechung) (2012) 
GRURInt. p. 695. 
8 “The Age of Enlightenment was a cultural movement especially in Europe beginning in 
the late 17th and 18th century. It can be described as a “desire for human affairs to be 
guided by rationality rather than by faith, superstition, or revelation; a belief in the power 
of human reason to change society and liberate the individual from the restraints of 
custom or arbitrary authority; all backed up by a world view increasingly validated by 
science rather than by religion or tradition.” Dorinda Outram: The Enlightenment 
(1995), p. 3; See also Wilson, Judy Ellen, Reill, Hanns Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment 
(2004) Revised Edition ix et. seq.; Teschemacher, Rudolf “Patentschutz und Marktmacht“ 
(Buchbesprechung) (2012) GRURInt. p. 695. 
9 Teschemacher, Rudolf “Patentschutz und Marktmacht“ (Buchbesprechung) (2012) 
GRURInt. p. 695. 
10 Inventor and the founder of the Siemens company. 
11 See for a brief introduction into the patent history in Europe: Uhrich, Ralph Stoffschutz 
(2010) p. 15 et. seq.  
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However, this did not end the discussions about the justification of a 
patent system and its consequences. In the mid-20th century economists 
started to increasingly challenge patent protection systems; and their 
arguments won significant influence with USA-based criticism in 
international organisations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organisations´s (WTO) predecessor, or 
the Andenpakt.12 
 
Despite all the patent criticism it seems to have become 
indisputable in the last few decades that the possibility to obtain patent 
protection on acceptable terms is an important competitive factor in the 
global competition of nations. Almost all states in the world, both industrial 
nations and developing ones, East and West, South and North, argue for 
patent protection in a more or less distinctive form. According to the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO, patent protection is also guaranteed in a 
legally binding way in all WTO member states.13 
 
At the same time most of the states in the world with a population 
exceeding 80,000 inhabitants also enacted competition laws with the aim 
of regulating market competition by fighting anticompetitive practices, such 
as the formation of monopolies and the abuse of market power.14 Hence, 
competition guardians pay close attention to the holders of intellectual 
property rights. This is because patent rights deny a competitor the launch 
of similar products on the market. This can lead to the abuse of market 
                                                             
12 Teschemacher, Rudolf “Patentschutz und Marktmacht“ (Buchbesprechung) (2012) 
GRURInt. p.695; Nogues, Julio “Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs – Understanding the 
Pressures on Developing Countries (1990). 
13 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm. 
14 Papadopoulos, Anestis The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy 
(2010) Cambridge University Press. p. 15. 
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power and stifling of healthy competition, especially if the right holder 
enjoys a dominant position in a particular market.15  
 
Thus, it seems to be clear that patent law and competition law, at 
least at first sight, pursue completely opposite goals: On the one hand, 
patent law grants monopoly rights, which enable the patent holder to deny 
others the use of protected technology. On the other hand, competition 
law considers monopolies as harmful since they restrict competition.  
 
Furthermore, account needs to be taken of the fact that the 
problematic relationship between patents and competition law has been 
aggravated in the past years. This coincides not least with the aspect that 
technical innovations and hence patents have become more and more 
important. The number of registered patents has been growing rapidly 
worldwide.16 In a mobile phone alone there are hundreds of different 
patented technologies nowadays.17 Whoever intends, for instance, to 
develop, produce or sell complex technical devices, must often realise that 
he will be infringing patents. He is then dependent on a license to use the 
patented technology which only the patent holder can grant him. If such a 
license is refused, then the question arises, whether such refusal can be 
abusive and anticompetitive. 
 
In addition, the introduction of technical standards keeps growing.18 
The technical versatility, such as in the area of the computer or 
entertainment industry, makes it necessary to standardise technology. For 
example, the MP3 standard makes sure that music data has the same 
                                                             
15 Teschemacher, Rudolf “Patentschutz und Marktmacht“ (Buchbesprechung) (2012) 
GRURInt. p.695; Nogues, Julio “Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs – Understanding the 
Pressures on Developing Countries” (1990). 
16 See for instance the USPTO statistics chart: 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm or the patent statistics of the 
European Commission: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Patent_statistics. 
17 See: http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2009/11/articles/how-many-patents-take-build-
iPhone.asp. 
18 See for instance the WTO statement about technical barriers to trade: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm. 
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technical format worldwide and can be thus read and played by any MP3 
player. Such a standard, however, acts at the same time as a market 
access barrier increasing the market power of those who are in the 
possession of patents concerning so-called “standard relevant” or 
“standard essential” MP3 technology.  
 
On the other hand, great importance has been attached to the 
combating of monopolies and other anticompetitive practices by courts 
and competition authorities in the last years. Recently, for instance, the 
European Commission made headlines with its cases against companies 
like Microsoft regarding the violation of the EU competition law.19 It is 
therefore no surprise that courts, especially in Europe, are facing the 
question of how intellectual property rights and competition law can be 
brought in line.  
 
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to take a closer look at this interesting 
relationship between patent rights and competition law. The focus will be 
set on European and German law. The reason for it is that the European 
courts already started to deal with the relation between intellectual 
property and competition law decades ago and have assumed a leading 
role in handling the anticompetitive exercise of intellectual property rights. 
Apart of the European focus the legal situation in South Africa will be 
elicited as well and, as far as possible, analysed against the background 
of the European situation. 
 
Since the relation between intellectual property rights, like patents, 
and competition law is an extremely comprehensive and multi-layered 
problem area, the so called FRAND20 objection in patent infringement 
proceedings concerning so called standard essential patents (SEPs) will 
be used and analysed as a representative example for the entire problem. 
                                                             
19 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21684329. 
20 The term “FRAND” referers to the licensing according to so called FRAND (Fair, 
Reasonable and Non Discriminatory) conditions. 
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This case is especially relevant, since a German patent court has recently 
referred five questions regarding the FRAND objection to the European 
Court of Justice.21  
 
When dealing with the FRAND objection the key issue is, on the 
one hand, that the patent holder’s refusal to grant a license to others 
according to FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) conditions 
can be deemed as an abuse of a market dominant position and therefore 
as anticompetitive. This thesis analyses in which cases the exercise of 
intellectual property laws can constitute a breach of competition law.  
 
Subsequently, on the other hand, the question arises whether the 
patent infringer can defend himself in patent infringement proceedings in 
Court using the argument that the patent owner and claimant did not grant 
him a license in the past and that this refusal has been anticompetitive. 
The goal of this thesis is to analyse whether the legal practice of courts is 
appropriate.  
 
In order to understand the relationship between patent law and 
competition law it is necessary to explain first how both legal institutes 
have developed and what their objectives are. Only then can it be clarified 
which of the two legal institutions can be given priority in particular conflict 
cases. Following this introduction chapter 2 of this thesis therefore 
discusses the historical development of patent law as well as its objectives 
and theories. By contrast, chapter 3 subsequently illustrates the 
development and the objectives of modern European and South African 
competition law. Furthermore, it also deals with the relevant European 
competition law provisions in general in order to respond in chapter 4 to 
the question about the relationship between intellectual property rights and 
competition law with focus on European case law in particular.  
                                                             
21 See http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/03/german-court-refers-huawei-zte-
standard.html. 
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Having made these general observations this thesis addresses in 
its 5th chapter industry standards and so called “standard-relevant” or 
“standard essential” patents (SEPs) before analysing EU case law 
regarding the FRAND objection. This objection is based on the right to the 
grant of a compulsory license according to competition law.  
 
After having given an account for the legal situation in Europe 
chapter 6 focuses on relevant South African competition law provisions 
and on the question how the South African courts assess the relationship 
between intellectual property law and competition law.  
 
Finally, chapter 7, first summarises the main findings of this thesis, 
draws numerous conclusions from these findings and makes 
recommendations especially on how the FRAND objection can be 
regulated. As the FRAND objection is an objection based on competition 
law this thesis will only focus on competition law related compulsory 
licenses. Other compulsory license provisions e.g. with regard to 
pharmaceuticals and other essential goods which can be found inter alia in 
patent law provisions like Art. 31 TRIPS, Sec. 56 South African Patent Act 
or Sec. 24 PatG (German Patent Act) will not be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 2: PATENT LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Patent law deals with the protection of technical inventions. According to 
general principles, these inventions must be new, based on an inventive 
step and, finally, industrially applicable.22 This protection is applied in the 
form of a national exclusive right.23 An essential requirement for the 
granting of patent rights is that the inventor reveals the object of his 
invention to the public. This revelation of the technical subject matter of an 
invention is an essential part of the patent specification.24  
 
 In return for revealing the invention, and thus for the enrichment of 
the knowledge pool, the state grants the inventor the privilege and 
monopole of economic exploitation. The patent right differs from the know-
how protection in this respect. The latter can be utilized without state 
“privilege” only as long as the invention is still secret and is not a part of 
the technological prior art.25 
 
The patent holder has the possibility of defending his exclusive right 
in court by enjoining others from using the patented technology or by 
demanding compensation for damages.26  
 
Patents have two historical origins.27 If one regards patents in light 
of the granting of a certain advantage in favour of the one who has 
                                                             
22 See for instance Art. 27 TRIPS or Section 1 German Patent Act (PatG); Thorley, Simon 
and others Terrell on the Laws of Patents (2000) p. 11.  
23 Osterrieth, Christian Patentrecht (Patent Law) (2010) para. 1. 
24 Kraßer, Rudolf Patentrecht (Patent Law) (2009) p. 489 et. seq. 
25 Osterrieth, Christian Patentrecht (Patent Law) (2010) para. 4. 
26 Cornish, William Rodolph Intellectual Property (1999) p. 7.  
27 Osterrieth, Christian Patentrecht (Patent Law) (2010) para 24; Kraßer, Rudolf 
Patenrecht (Patent Law) (2009) p. 54 et. seq. 
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achieved something that benefits the public, the origins of the patent right 
ultimately go back to the medieval privilege system.28 
 
The idea of giving privileges to particular individuals for 
achievements that are of special interest to the public or the state, so they 
can have the yield of their efforts for a specific time period, can be traced 
back to the Middle Ages.29 At that time, the privilege system’s key 
objective was, however, the promotion of trade and not the selective 
sovereign promotion of the invention as such. 
 
At least concept-wise, the predecessors of today's patents can be 
seen in the invention and adoption privileges when the granting of 
privileges was handed out with public documents, called “litterae 
patentes”. Today's term “patent” derives from this phrase.30 
 
However, the origins of today's patent legislation would not have 
been possible without the French Revolution’s new concept of humans as 
carriers of genuine human rights and freedoms. Hence, the French 
Revolution did not only promote the development of the modern patent 
rights by eliminating the abuse of the patent system, but also by perceiving 
and acknowledging the human as an inventor and the inventor as 
human.31 If inventive activity is acknowledged as being protected as a 
human right, it can reasonably be expected that the result of the inventive 
activity should be acknowledged as a natural property right of the inventor 
with regard to his invention.32  
 
 
                                                             
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Thorley, Simon and others Terrell on the Laws of Patents (2000) p. 1.  
31 Kraßer, Rudolf Patenrecht (Patent Law) (2009) p. 60. 
32 Ibid. 
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2.2 Purpose of patent law33 
 
2.2.1 General considerations 
 
It is widely accepted that, in general terms, patent law serves the purpose 
of creating an adequate balance between the interests of the inventor, the 
competitors and the general public.34 However, this insight does not 
answer the question why the legal system grants the patent owner at all 
the authority to exclude others – for a limited period of time - from the use 
of the innovation and to monetize it.35 
 
Importantly, however, the legal system does not protect all technical 
inventions or all intellectual achievements. Instead, legislation only 
protects certain concepts, insights, ideas and creations that are 
considered especially worthy of protection.36 Whether or not legal 
protection for immaterial goods is afforded is a crucial one as a 
comprehensive assignment of all intellectual concepts to individual right 
holders similar to the law of property or the right in rem would unjustifiably 
stifle the academic, economic and cultural progress.37 
 
 
2.2.2 Natural law theory 
 
The natural law theory38 was described in the preamble of the French 
patent law by the French constituent assembly in 1791 in the following 
manner: 
                                                             
33 This chapter partly draws from an Assignment written by the author of this thesis in 
2013 as part of the course Principles of Intellectual Property Law at University of Cape 
Town: Bornhaeusser, Matthias Assignment 3 Course “Principles of IP Law” CML5678F 
(2013). 
34 Haedicke, Maximilian Patenrecht (2012) p. 4. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Schonwetter, Tobias “Safeguarding a fair copyright balance - contemporary challenges 
in a changing world: Lessons to be learnt from a developing country perspective” (2009) 
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“Each new idea, the realization or development of which can be of 
use to the society, belongs first and foremost to the one who has devised 
it and it would be a violation of the essence of human rights, if an industrial 
invention would not be acknowledged as a property of its creator.”39 
 
Thus, the natural law theory acts on the assumption that every 
human has a natural “property right” in his own ideas. Using the ideas of 
third parties for oneself is considered “theft”. According to this theory the 
society has a moral obligation of protecting intellectual achievements, 
regardless of what sort, and to equate them with physical property.40 The 
property theory has its origin in John Locke's work theory, according to 
which the human possesses himself and, hence, his own intellectual 
achievements.41 
 
However, it becomes clear that the property theory cannot be valid 
in general as not all intellectual achievements justify an exclusive right in 
favour of those who have created it. Especially patents are granted only 
under strict conditions because a patent application has to fulfil the 
necessary legal and formal requirements.42 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
p. 32; Kraßer, Rudolf Patenrecht (Patent Law) (2009) p. 36 Fisher, William “Theories of 
Intellectual Property” (2001) p. 4 available at: 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf; Grady, Mark F., Alexander, Jay I. 
“Patent Law and Rent Dissipation” (1992) Virginia Law Review Vol. 78, No. 1 Symposium 
on the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property pp. 305, 310 available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/valr78&div=21&id=&page=; 
Haedicke, Maximilian Patentrecht (Patent Law) (2012) p. 6. 
39 Cited in Sprengler, Albrecht “Ist eine friedliche Koexistenz zwischen 
Wettbewerbsfreiheit und Patentschutz denkbar?“ („Can patent protection and freedom of 
competition coexist peacefully“?) (1961) GRURInt. p. 607. 
40 Uhrich, Ralf Stoffschutz (2010) (PhD Dissertation) p. 99. 
41 Locke, John Two Treatises of Civil Government Book II (1764) chapter 5, sec. 25 et 
seq.  
42 Haedicke, Maximilian Patentrecht (Patent Law) (2012) p. 6. 
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2.2.3 Reward theory 
 
The reward theory's purpose is to reward the inventor for his efforts and 
his revelation as a “teacher of the nation” and a “benefactor of the 
community”.43 With a special focus on the revelation requirement the 
reward theory is also called social contract theory, especially in the Anglo-
Saxon legal system: The inventor increases the available technical 
knowledge to the community in return for patent protection in the sense of 
a synallagmatic contract.44 In particular, the 19th century English national 
economists advanced this thesis, above all John Stuart Mill, who rejected 
monopolies, yet argued for patents as a justified reward for the inventor's 
performance,45 stating that: 
 
“The condemnation of monopolies ought not to extend to patents, 
by which the originator of a new process is permitted to enjoy, for a limited 
period, the exclusive privilege of using his own improvement. This is not 
making the commodity dearer for his benefit, but merely postponing a part 
of the increased cheapness (or excellence) which the public owe to the 
inventor, in order to compensate and reward him for his service.”46   
 
                                                             
43 Beier, Friedrich-Karl “Die herkömmlichen Patentrechtstheorien und die sozialistische 
Konzeption des Erfinderrechts“ (“Traditional patent theories and the socialist theory of the 
inventors´ right“) (1970) GRUR Int.p.1, 2; Schmidt, Alexander K. Erfinderprinzip und 
Erfinderpersönlichkeitsrecht im deutschen Patentrecht von 1877 bis 1936 (Inventor 
principle and the right of the inventor in German Patent Law between 1877 and 1936) 
(2009) (PhD Dissertation) p.19. 
44 Uhrich, Ralf Stoffschutz (2010) (PhD Dissertation) p.100; Beier, Friedrich-Karl “Die 
herkömmlichen Patentrechtstheorien und die sozialistische Konzeption des 
Erfinderrechts“ (“Traditional patent theories and the socialist theory of the inventors´ 
right“) (1970) GRUR Int.p.1, 2. 
45 Schmidt, Alexander K. Erfinderprinzip und Erfinderpersönlichkeitsrecht im deutschen 
Patentrecht von 1877 bis 1936 (Inventor principle and the right of the inventor in German 
Patent Law between 1877 and 1936) (2009) (PhD Dissertation) p. 20. 
46 Mill, John Stuart Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to 
Social Philosophy (1909) p. 271. 
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Some German economists argued similarly: The state should give a 
social reward to the inventor for his provision of knowledge to the 
community.47  
 
 
2.2.4 Incentive theory 
 
The so-called incentive theory relates mainly to the general social interest 
in technical progress. It presumes that inventions would only be carried 
out and used if they resulted in adequate profit. Since the earnings 
expectation is much too uncertain if the innovation could be soon taken 
over by the competition48 such competition – according to the incentive 
theory – needs to be prevented for a certain period of time. Consequently,, 
patent protection significantly increases the readiness to invest effort and 
resources in new technical solutions and their application. Patent 
protection granted to the individual is thus a simple, cheap and efficient 
tool to promote progress.49 
 
 
2.2.5 Contract- or revelation theory 
 
In contrast to the reward theory, the contract theory emphasises “the non-
rival nature” of patents.50 The contract theory is based on the 
consideration that the patent is a contract which the inventor closes with 
the public and in which he gives up his possession of the secret. It is 
presumed that it is in the interest of the entire public to reveal new 
technological knowledge as soon as possible. This could be provided by 
                                                             
47 Böhmert, Victor Die Erfindungspatente nach volkswirthschaftlichen Grundsätzen und 
industriellen Erfahrungen mit besonderer Rücksicht auf England und die Schweiz 
 (Invention patents according to economic principles with special regard to England and 
Switzerland) (Besonderer Abdruck aus der Vierteljahrschrift für Volkswirthschaft und 
Kulturgeschichte) (1869) Vol I p.73 et seq. 
48 Kraßer, Rudolf Patenrecht (Patent Law) (2009) sec. 3 II 3. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Denicolò, Vincenzo ans others “The contract theory of patents” International Review of 
Law and Economics 23 (2004) 365–380. 
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offering the inventor a patent in return.51 This theory faces a long tradition 
with courts. Already in the case Universal Oil Products v. Globe 
Oil&Refining the US Supreme Court stated that: “As a reward for 
inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a 
17-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a 
trade secret. But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in 
sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention 
once the period of the monopoly has expired; and the same precision of 
disclosure is likewise essential to warn the industry concerned of the 
precise scope of the monopoly asserted.”52 
 
One could argue that the revelation theory - just like the reward 
theory and the incentive theory – do not mandate a patent system based 
on exclusive patent rights. Instead, the inventor could, for example, be 
“rewarded” sufficiently with a corresponding acknowledgment and, 
possibly, a claim for remuneration against the state.53 However, it would 
be problematic to determine the criteria according to which the claim for 
remuneration should be given in individual cases.54 In addition, if one 
assumed that the majority of inventors nowadays work for companies, it is 
questionable whether these companies would be willing to engage in 
costly innovative activity if profit expectations could possibly be reduced to 
zero by an imitation.55 Of course one could argue that in contrast to 
seeking patent protection companies could keep details of the invention 
secret. But then, as a consequence, the new technological knowledge 
would not be revealed to the public. 
                                                             
51 Machlup, Fritz Die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Patentrechts (Economic principles 
of patent law) (1962) p. 377. 
52 Universal Oil Products v Globe Oil & Refining Co. available at: 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/322/471. 
53 Hirsch, Hans “Patentrecht und Wettbewerbsordnung“ (Competitive order and patent 
law) (1970) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (WuW) p. 99 et. seq. 
54 Bußmann, J. “Patentrecht und Marktwirtschaft“ (Patent law and market economy) 
(1977) p. 121 et seq. 
55 Bernhardt, W. Die Bedeutung des Patentschutzes in der Industriegesellschaft (The 
relevance of patent protection in industrialized societies) (1974) p. 16. 
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2.2.6 Negative patent theories – patent criticism 
 
The term “negative patent theories” summarises the arguments of those 
who do not acknowledge any justification for patent protection. The 
negative patent theory stands in opposition to the aforementioned positive 
patent theories, which provide justifications for patent protection. The 
historical roots of a negative attitude towards patent protection in Germany 
for example go back to the initial stage of the German patent system in the 
first half of the 19th century. When the German kingdom Prussia created a 
patent law as the first one from the German territories in 1815, the idea of 
patent protection was, at first, accompanied by a flood of 
enthusiasm.56 However, this era was also formed by the just achieved 
economic freedom, which the German national economists soon regarded 
as diametrically opposed to the granting act of patent rights to inventors.57  
 
The basic thesis of the representatives of the negative patent theory 
is based on the concept of equalizing patents with monopolies.58 The view 
of the advocates of the (positive) reward theory, who elicit as a justification 
for the patent protection that the inventor would have to receive a “reward” 
(in the form of a patent) for his social achievement (the invention) is 
countered by the argument that one should not be rewarded for revealing 
a technical concept, more or less by accident, as the first one, which 
actually emerges from the collective knowledge of the community.59 A 
counterargument for the reward theory is also that the granting of 
exclusive patent rights, as performed by the patent law, cannot be 
justified. After all, a reward for the intellectual achievement of the inventor 
                                                             
56 Scheffler, Dietrich “Die (ungenutzten) Möglichkeiten des Rechtsinstituts der 
Zwangslizenz“ (The unexploited possibilities of compulsory licensing) (2003) GRUR p.97. 
57 Bußmann, Joachim Die patentrechtliche Zwangslizenz (The compulsory license in 
patent law) (PhD Dissertation) (1975) p. 7. 
58 Machlup, Fritz Die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Patentrechts (Econimic principles 
of patent law) (1962) p. 18. 
59 Ibid. 
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could be also done in a different way and does not necessarily have to 
end in such a strong right like the patent right.60 
 
Some advocates for the negative patent theory even put into 
question the incentive effect of patents. In their opinion, the opposite takes 
place; as soon as a producer owns a patent, he is no longer motivated to 
further improve his product.61 
 
 
2.2.7 Patent criticism in developing countries 
 
Especially since the TRIPS agreement came into effect in 1996 the WTO 
has been facing increasing criticism by developing countries. The TRIPS 
agreement 62 under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
is considered by industrialised nations as a breakthrough in protecting and 
enforcing intellectual property.63 The agreement leads, for the first time, to 
an international alignment of the protection of intellectual property rights at 
a relatively high level committing most developing countries to a significant 
increase of the protection level on their state territory.64 Since January 1st, 
2005, developing countries that are not Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs)65 must implement the conditions of the TRIPS agreement for 
                                                             
60 Koikkara, Sonia Elisabeth Der Patentschutz und das Institut der Zwangslizenz in der 
Europäischen Union (Patent protection and compulsory licenses in the EU) (2010) (PhD 
Dissertation) p. 20. 
61 Ibid. 
62 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) has 
been signed in 1994 together with other international agreements which founded the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. The TRIPS Agreement is administered by 
the WTO and defines minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property right in 
the WTO member states. It was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, see 
http://nyulaw.libguides.com/content.php?pid=55653&sid=423974. 
63 See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, Carlos M. Correa (Ed.) Intellectual Property and International 
Trade: TRIPS Agreement 2nd edition (2008) p.23 et seq. 
64 Ibid. 
65 The term “Least Developed Country (LDC)” refers to a state that, according to the UN, 
has the lowest indicators of socioeconomic development, with the lowest Human 
Development Index ratings, see: Srinivasan, T.N. Trade, Growth and Poverty Reduction 
(2009) 3.1.; UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries 
(UN-UNOHRLLS) http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/. 
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protection of intellectual property rights and grant the full product patent 
protection for drugs.66 Hence, the economic-political option in these 
countries to exclude drugs from the patent protection and to motivate the 
production of low-priced generics is no longer valid. This has not only 
consequences for the access to drugs in these countries, but also in the 
LDCs. The drug supply in the LDCs is highly dependent at the moment, 
particularly in the case of HIV/AIDS, on imports from advanced producer 
countries such as India.67 Thus, this element of the international Global 
Governance architecture interferes significantly in the national capacity to 
act.68 In many cases, therefore, TRIPS is described by its critics rather as 
a result of the lobbying process by multinational companies, whose goal is 
to establish global monopoles for the application of business ideas, 
inventions and discoveries.69   
 
The most intensive dispute has been over AIDS drugs for Africa. 
Despite the unjustifiable role that patents played in Africa in the erosion of 
the public health service according to critics, the TRIPS agreement was 
changed in 2005, however, according to the critics' view only 
insignificantly.70 
 
                                                             
66 Liebig, Klaus (2006) “Auswirkungen des internationalen Patentregimes auf die 
Medikamentenproduktion und den Zugang zu Medikamenten in LDC's“ Deutsches Institut 
für Entwicklungspolitik / German Development Institute (Studies 18). 
67 Liebig, Klaus “Protection of intellectual property in the world trading system: the TRIPS 
agreement and developing countries” (2001) available at: http://www.die-gdi.de/briefing-
paper/article/protection-of-intellectual-property-in-the-world-trading-system-the-trips-
agreement-and-developing-countries/; Liebig, Klaus Auswirkungen des internationalen 
Patentregimes auf die Medikamentenproduktion und den Zugang zu Medikamenten in 
LDC's (2006) Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / German Development Institute 
(Studies 18) p 4. 
68 Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Geistige Eigentumsrechte und 
Wissenserwerb in Entwicklungsländern available at: http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-
Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ENTR-
7BEJPR?OpenDocument&nav=expand:Forschung%20und%20Beratung%5CProjekte;act
ive:Forschung%20und%20Beratung%5CProjekte%5CENTR-7BEJPR. 
69 Drahos, Peter, Braithwaite, John “Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy?“ (2002) New York: The New Press, USA. 
70 See for instance Thomas, John “HIV/AIDS Drugs, Patents and the TRIPS Agreement: 
Issues and Options” (2001) CRS Report for Congress, available at: 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL31066.pdf. 
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Critics focused particularly on the prices for antiviral drugs for 
treatment of the immune deficiency disease AIDS, that in consequence of 
the patent protection in the respective countries, could be determined by 
the pharmaceutical industry itself.71 A great majority of the people in 
developing countries cannot afford these drugs. The relation between high 
prices for drugs and the existing patent protection is by no means a rumor, 
but a fact. A study of the United Nations has shown that 150mg of the 
AIDS drug Flucanozol, in India, where there is no patent protection, costs 
(only) 55 USD, whereas on the Philippines, on the other hand, where the 
drug has a patent protection, 817 USD.72  
 
Therefore, particularly against such backdrop, both the purpose and 
the benefit of the patent protection are often doubted and questioned.  
However, one should note that the TRIPS agreement does not lead to a 
complete harmonization of the protection conditions, but it leaves wiggle 
room for political trade to the WTO member countries. Individual member 
countries can still grant compulsory licenses, provided that certain 
principles are observed. Moreover, the TRIPS agreement's purpose is to 
simplify the licensing for public, non-commercial use of drugs and to allow 
parallel imports. Exceptions from the patentability remain possible within 
narrow limits.73  
 
 
2.2.8 Concluding remarks 
 
Patent protection, even though widely spread and acclaimed, is facing 
increasing criticism. It is argued that the current patent protection systems 
                                                             
71 Sykes, Alan O. “TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha 
“Solution” available at: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html. 
72 See United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner, 
“The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights 
on Human Rights” 44, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 2001). 
73 Liebig, Klaus “Auswirkungen des internationalen Patentregimes auf die 
Medikamentenproduktion und den Zugang zu Medikamenten in LDC's (2006) Deutsches 
Institut für Entwicklungspolitik“ German Development Institute (Studies 18) p 4. 
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as provided for under international treaties and agreements are too rigid 
and inflexible. It is particularly problematic that these systems provide 
insufficient access mechanisms even in cases where such access is 
justified. Some also argue that the social and economic costs of having a 
patent system surpass the economic benefit of patent protection. The 
substantial criticism is aimed at the effects of the high levels of patent 
protection implemented by developing countries as a result of the TRIPS 
agreement. It is feared that patents of foreign companies are often entitled 
to block the access of the community and local companies to crucial 
knowledge and innovation.74 Especially regarding patents for chemical, 
pharmaceutical and bio-technological innovations patent rights can lead to 
a deteriorated access of wide circles of the population to pharmaceutical 
products due to the higher prices for drugs.75 Particularly in this context 
the question is raised whether the discussed theories for the justification of 
patent protection are sufficiently suited to justify a worldwide minimal 
protection for innovations as provided for under the TRIPS agreement.76 
 
However, despite this criticism the conclusion can be drawn that 
positive effects of patents as such offset their negative effects in many 
cases. This is the case in particular if account is taken of the fact that the 
various patent right theories do not exclude each other, but that they are 
related to each other and supplement each other. Whereas some theories 
aim at presenting the patent right as an imperative of justice and the 
individual interests of the inventor as worthy of protection, others 
substantiate its use for the community.77  
 
                                                             
74
 Dutfield, Graham “TRIPS and its impact on developing countries” (2001) available at: 
http://www.scidev.net/global/policy-brief/trips-and-its-impact-on-developing-
countries.html. 
75 Haedicke, Maximilian, Timmann Henrik Handbuch Patentrecht (Handbook Patent Law) 
((2012) sec. 1 para. 12. 
76 Koikkara, Sonia Elisabeth Der Patentschutz und das Institut der Zwangslizenz in der 
Europäischen Union (Patent protection and compulsory licenses in the EU) (2010) (PhD 
Dissertation) p. 22. 
77 Kraßer, Rudolf Patenrecht (Patent Law) (2009) sec. 3 II 5. 
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Of course, a patent can solely be seen as a right to stop others from 
doing something.78 One could also say that that patent law creates 
monopolies which by definition are anti-competitive. However, this chapter 
has shown that patents also serve as an incentive for companies to invest 
in new technologies and therefore to enter into technological competition. 
Therefore, patents are useful and clearly have effects which are beneficial 
to competition. 
 
 
2.3 Special considerations with regard to South African patent law  
 
An important particularity of the South African patent system is the lack of 
any substantive examination for patentability of the patent application.79 
Hence, one can register almost any “invention” in South Africa, as long as 
the formal requirements are fulfilled. So the assessment whether a patent 
really withstands is decided only in court. This is a crucial difference to 
other major patent systems, e.g. in Europe and the United States. This 
situation can lead to problems because the patent applicant can take legal 
proceedings against alleged patent infringers on the account of his patent, 
even though the patent has not been previously substantially asserted 
regarding its effectiveness by the Patent Office. The defendant is left no 
other choice but to defend himself in an expensive and time-consuming 
process against the claim of infringement and to prove the invalidity of the 
claimant’s patent.  
 
Thus, the question about objective of patent rights is raised in such 
a system all the more because in this patent system one can obtain a 
patent relatively simple. Consequently this fact also plays a role when 
asking about the relation between intellectual property law and competition 
                                                             
78 See Laddie Hugh and others The modern law of copyright and designs 3rd 
edition(2000) p. 1et seq. 
79 Patent Regulations, 1978, regulations 41, 44; Klopper, Hennie B. Law of Intellectual 
Property in South Africa (2011) p. 294; for a detailed overview see Burrell, TD and others 
Burrells South African Patent and Design Law (1999) 1.22 et seq. 
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law because in South Africa it is much easier to obtain market power and 
monopolies through patents because no substantial examination takes 
place here. 
 
However, recently, more and more voices have been raised in 
South Africa for a patent system with a substantial patent examination.80 In 
addition, the draft National IP Policy makes concrete suggestions for 
introducing an examination based system in South Africa.81  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: COMPETITION LAW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The cartel law or competition law deals, in general, with the prevention of 
limitations in competition.82 The often used designation “cartel” is, 
therefore, too restrictive, since almost all known competition laws do not 
only fight the formation of cartels, but also deal with other competition- 
restraining forms and practices.83 Since the goal of competition law is to 
disable undesirable restraints of competition, the decisive questions of 
every competition law are: what does the term competition mean; when is 
it restrained; and which restraints are in fact undesirable.84 This said, there 
is almost unanimous consent in the literature that the term “competition” 
does not have a homogeneous and general definition.85 It is much more 
appropriate not to make an attempt to define the competition as such, but 
rather to ask immediately whether a restraint of competition has occurred 
                                                             
80 See for instance the presentations on the recent Africa IP Forum held in 2013 which 
are available at http://www.thedti.gov.za/business_regulation/business_regulation.jsp. 
81 See http://ip-unit.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/DRAFT-IP-POLICY.pdf. 
82 Neef, Andreas Kartellrecht (Cartel Law) (2008) para 1. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Emmerich, Volker Kartellrecht (Cartel Law) (2012) sec. 1 para 2. 
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in certain circumstances86 – and this is the case when a function of the 
competition is affected.87 Notably, there is no uniform purpose of 
competition law. The competition laws of different jurisdictions follow 
different concepts and thus serve different purposes.  
 
The remaining part of this chapter will give a brief overview of both the 
modern European and the latest South African competition law before 
going more into detail by analysing the relevant case law regarding the 
relation between intellectual property rights and competition law as well as 
the relevant sections of the Competition Act.  
 
 
3.2 European Competition Law – overview and objectives 
 
In the 1957 Treaty of Rome (officially Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (TEEC)), which established the European Economic 
Community (the predecessor of the European Union), member states 
opted for an economic order that was marked by open markets and 
undistorted competition.88 This decision was confirmed in the later 
versions of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1958 as well as in the Reform Treaty of Lisbon of 
2007, and is the foundation for the definition of the European competition 
in detail.89 
 
Since 2009, European competition law is regulated in Art. 101 ff. of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)90. The 
competition law provisions were taken over without changes from the 
                                                             
86 Emmerich, Volker Kartellrecht (Cartel Law) (2012) sec. 1 para 2. 
87 Neef, Andreas Kartellrecht (Cartel Law) (2008) para 2; See also section 2(1) of the 
Competition Act 1980 UK. 
88 Jones, Alison, Brenda, Sufrin EC Competition Law (2000) p. 4 et seq. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF. 
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Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEC), so one 
can still refer to legal practices and literature for the preceding provisions 
of Artt. 85 ff. TEC (until 1997) and Artt. 81 ff. TEC.91 
 
Under the TFEU, the European Union, member states and the 
European system of central banks are committed to the “principle of an 
open market economy with free competition” (Art. 119 in conjunction with 
Art. 120 and Art. 127 TFEU). The essence of the competition rules 
includes the prohibition of competition restraining agreements (Art. 101 
TFEU), the prohibition of abuse of a market dominant position (Art. 102 
TFEU), the regulations for public companies (Art. 106 TFEU) and aid 
payments (Art. 107–109 TFEU).92 
 
The competition rules that are aimed directly at companies provide 
subjective rights for individuals that courts and public authorities of the 
member states must protect. Thereby, the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice has an elementary meaning for the interpretation, 
application and further development of the competition law.93  
 
EU competition law has several objectives.94 One very important 
objective is to economically integrate the various member states into the 
EU system. A common EU market with an unlimited free movement of 
goods and people within EU territory is an important goal of the European 
community.95 The European competition law is also concerned about 
business opportunities for small and medium size enterprises and their 
capacity to compete in the global market.96  
 
                                                             
91 Imenga, Ulrich, Mestmäcker Joachim-Ernst Wettbewerbsrecht Part I (Competition Law 
I) A I; See also Jones, Alison, Brenda, Sufrin EC Competition Law (2000) p. 20 et seq. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Korah, Valentine Competition Law of the European Community (2001) 2nd Ed. Vol. 1 1-
20. 
95 Fox, Eleonore “Global Competition Policy US and EU Competition Law – A 
Comparison” (2011) p. 340. 
96 Ibid. 
 
24 
 
However, the EU competition policies’ main goals are protecting 
competition on the market to enhance and to protect consumer welfare97 
and to achieve maximum economic efficiency.98 Despite these main 
objectives, however, the language of the European Competition law 
seems to “accept a larger element of “industrial policy” and “fairness” than 
is e.g. accepted in the USA”.99 
 
 
3.3 South African competition law - overview and objectives 
 
When dealing with the South African competition law one needs to 
consider the following: First of all, South African competition law is 
relatively young. However, spectacular competition law cases, for 
instance, in the food industry have nevertheless managed to make it 
present in the consciousness of the broad public.100 Also, shortly before 
the FIFA Football World Cup in 2010 the suspicion of price arrangement of 
several airlines caused a stir.101  
 
South African competition law is a mixture of various sources thus 
having features from the US, European and Canadian laws.102 Therefore, 
it would be obvious to consider the corresponding role models when 
interpreting South African competition law. However, one must be careful: 
South Africa's history as well as its position as a developing country103 
                                                             
97 See Communication from the Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) 
of the Treaty (2004/C 101/08). 
98 Chetty, Vani, Nathan, Edward “The Place of Public Interest in South Africa´s 
Competition Legislation” (2005) p. 2. 
99 Ibid. 
100 See for instance: http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/2014/01/13/entrenched-market-
power-still-a-concern; See also The Competition Commission vs Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 
Case 15/CR/Feb07. 
101 See Federico, Giulio “SAA II:Abuse of dominance in the South African skies” (2013) 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/federico_saa2_en.pdf. 
102 Klees, Andreas “Das südafrikanische Kartellrecht nach dem Competition Amendment 
Act 2009“ (“South African competition law after the Competition Amendment” Act 2009”) 
(2011) WuW p. 140. 
103 See the United Nations Country Classification 2012: 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2012country_class.pdf
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may require a deviating interpretation of the South African law.104 One 
must also take into consideration that the South African competition law 
pursues not only competition goals but also a series of country-specific 
industrial and socio-political goals.105  
 
Until the end of Apartheid in 1994, the South African economy 
suffered from high levels of economic concentration caused by the small 
size of the South African economy, laws that disadvantaged small and 
medium size enterprises, the role of the mining industry, exchange control, 
lack of foreign investments and a prolonged recession.106 After the end of 
Apartheid, tremendous change occurred to the South African landscape, 
both politically and economically. The new ruling party, the African 
National Congress (ANC) put emphasis on tackling the problem of 
economic concentration.107 In order to do so, the ANC´s goal was, inter 
alia, to establish “strict antitrust legislation to create a more competitive 
economic environment.”108 The party worked on legislation which 
addressed the problems of “economic concentration, interlocking 
directorships and anticompetitive behavior such as market domination and 
abuse”.109 Therefore, it aimed to review “the structure of economic control 
and competition and develop efficient democratic solutions”.110 
 
In 1997, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published 
"Proposed Guidelines for Competition Policy: A Framework for 
                                                             
104 
Klees, Andreas “Das südafrikanische Kartellrecht nach dem "Competition Amendment 
Act 2009“ (South African competition law after the „Competition Amendment” Act 2009) 
(2011) WuW p. 140; Sutherland/Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, Issue 12 
(October 2009), 4.2. 
105 See p. 72. 
106 Lee, Mendelson “Introduction to and analysis of South Africa’s new competition law 
regime” (2001). 
107 Sutherland, Philip, Kemp, Katharine and others Competition Law of South Africa (last 
updated 2012) 3-40. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Klees, Andreas “Das südafrikanische Kartellrecht nach dem "Competition Amendment 
Act 2009“ (South African competition law after the “Competition Amendment” Act 2009) 
(2011) WuW p. 140. 
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Competition, Competitiveness and Development".111 In 1998, the 
"Competition Act 89 of 1998" (in the following: CA 1998) was passed, 
which came into effect on 1 September 1999.112  
 
In essence, the CA 1998 established in South Africa a modern 
competition law containing per se bans for certain horizontal and vertical 
practices as well as a merger control system, but at the same time it 
attempted to follow additional country-specific industrial and socio-political 
goals. For the first time independent competition authorities were 
established with the Competition Commission (in the following: 
Commission) and the Competition Tribunal (in the following: Tribunal).113 
There is also the Competition Appeal Court. Apart from these institutions 
there are various sector-specific regulatory bodies such as the 
"Independent Communications Authority of South Africa" (ICASA) and the 
"National Energy Regulator" (NERSA). 114 
 
In 2006, the DTI carried out an evaluation of the competition law, 
which ended in the publication of a "Competition Policy Review". It 
confirmed that the Competition Act 1998 has improved on the whole the 
competition law in South Africa and, in particular, has consolidated the 
competition authorities. However, the Review also observed that many of 
the old problems still exist.115 Neither the competition nor the industrial and 
                                                             
111 Available at: 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/ProposedGuidelinesforCompetitionPolicy.htm; 
These guidelines provided the starting point for the negotiations with the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac). See also Brassey, M. S. M. 
Competition Law (2002, Reprint 2009) p. 85.  
112 The Competition Act as amended by the Competition Amendment Act, No 35 of 1999; 
Competition Amendment Act, No. 15 of 2000; Competition Second Amendment Act, No. 
39 of 2000, available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/pocket-book-2005-
R.pdf.  
113 Klees, Andreas “Das südafrikanische Kartellrecht nach dem "Competition Amendment 
Act 2009“ (South African competition law after the “Competition Amendment” Act 2009) 
(2011) WuW p. 140. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Hartzenberg, Trudi “Competition Policy and Practice in South Africa: Promoting 
Competition for Development Symposium on Competition Law and Policy in Developing 
Countries”, 26 Nw. J. Int'lL. & Bus. 667 (2006). P. 679 et seq. available at: 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol26/iss3/32. 
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socio-political goals, especially, the promotion of the market entry of small 
and mid-size companies and groups of persons that were discriminated 
during Apartheid,116 could be reached to the extent hoped for.117  
 
As a result of the Review, the DTI set out to intensify the existing 
enforcement regime.118 The focus was on the suppression of (interference 
and exploitation) malpractices of the market power by big companies.119 
Particular attention was paid to the monopolies and especially former state 
monopolies that were dismissed into unregulated markets in the process 
of privatization, before the CA 1998 took effect. As legislative measures 
the enablement of “market inquires” as well as the introduction of new 
regulations for the so-called “complex monopoly conduct” were proposed 
with the high market concentration in mind. Furthermore, the introduction 
of the personal responsibility of directors and managers, namely, the 
introduction of criminal penalties in case of certain infringements of the 
competition law was proposed.120 These propositions resulted in the 
"Competition Amendment Act 2009" (Act No. 1 of 2009; in the following: 
AA 2009)121, which came into effect on 28.8.2009.122  
 
                                                             
116  See the definition of "historically disadvantaged person" which was introduced with 
clause 1 Amendment Act in 2009. 
117 
Klees, Andreas “Das südafrikanische Kartellrecht nach dem "Competition Amendment 
Act 2009“ (South African competition law after the “Competition Amendment” Act 2009) 
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CHAPTER 4: THE RELATION BETEEN COMPETITION LAW AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE EU123 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In general, competition law acts neutrally towards patents and other 
intellectual property rights respecting them as an integral part of the 
European system of property ownership and competition.124 Therefore, it 
was a continuous issue for a long time whether, and if so under what 
conditions, intellectual property rights can be restricted by competition 
law.125 Traditionally, in both the USA and in Europe, there is a reluctance 
and reservation concerning the use of competition law mechanisms to 
restrict intellectual property.126 The prevailing view is that the mere 
possession of monopoly rights should not lead to competition law 
interventions. US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia gives his 
explanation on this issue in the case Verizon v. Trinko:127 
 
“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant 
charging of monopoly prices, is not unlawful; it is an important element of 
the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices – at 
least for a short period – is what attracts business acumen in the first 
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of 
                                                             
123 This chapter partly draws from an Assignment written by the author of this thesis in 
2013 as part of the course Competition Law at University of Cape Town. See: Matthias 
Bornhaeusser, Assignment “The Compulsory License Defense under Competition Law in 
Patent Infringement Proceedings – A German- European Perspective” Course 
CML5654S Competition Law (2013) University of Cape Town, South Africa. 
124 Walz, Axel ”Patentverletzungsklage im Lichte des Kartellrechts”(2013) GRUR Int. 718. 
125 Reynolds, Michael, Best Christopher “Article 102 and Innovation: The journey since 
Microsoft” (2012) International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2012 
Chapter 16 Fordham Law Institiute p. 323. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Currtis V. Trinko LLP (02-682) 540 
U.S. 398 (407) (2004). 
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monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an 
element of anticompetitive conduct.”128 
 
European courts generally share this opinion: According to 
European case law, patents and other intellectual property rights can 
infringe competition law only in exceptional cases.129 However, the 
European Commission has recently shown a rather different approach 
within the current investigation against Samsung and Motorola.130 Also, 
the criticism about the unlimited exercise of patent rights has become 
more prevalent in the last years.131 For instance, it has been more and 
more criticized that patent protection is extended to technologies such as 
databases or business methods, which – according to some - do not 
deserve any patent protection in the traditional sense.132 Furthermore, 
modern technology makes it increasingly difficult to handle patents: While 
there was usually only one patent in a product just a few decades ago, 
modern devices like, for instance, smartphones use directly or indirectly 
hundreds or even thousands of patents.133 So-called “patent thickets” thus 
come into being that can be hardly pervaded any more.134 Due to 
networking effects in the industry and industry standards, intellectual 
property rights can act virtually as market access barriers. The usage of 
intellectual property has changed as well. Today, patents have become 
mere investments and objects of speculation in many cases. The business 
                                                             
128 Ibid. 
129 See for instance: Case C-53/87  Cicra & Maxicar v Régie Renault  (1988) ECR 06039 
130 Press Release of the European Commission: “Antitrust: Commission sends Statement 
of Objections to Samsung on potential misuse of mobile phone standard-essential 
patents”(2012) IP/12/1448, see also Press Release of the European Commission “Anti-
Trust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on potential 
misuse of mobile phone standard-essential patents – Questions and Answers “(2012) 
IP/13/406. 
131Haedicke, Maximilian Patentrecht (2012) p. 45; Walz, Axel ”Patentverletzungsklage im 
Lichte des Kartellrechts”(2013) GRUR Int. 2013 p. 718. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Pressman, Aaron “Smartphone Patent Battles Hurting Consumers” (2013) Yahoo 
Finance Blog: http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/smartphone-patent-battles-
hurting-consumers-195702772.html. 
134 Shapiro, Carl “Navigating the Patent Thickets, Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and 
Standard Setting” (2000) Innovative Policy and the Economy 1National Bureau of 
Economic Research The MIT Press Cambridge England. 
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purpose of so-called “patent trolls” is solely to keep patents and take 
actions against industrial enterprises out of these patents. In contrast to 
traditional industries, those “trolls” do not produce the patent-protected 
technologies themselves.135 They just acquire the patents, hold them, 
defend them and convert them into cash.136  
 
 
4.2 The ECJ´s distinction between the existence and the exercise of 
intellectual property rights 
 
According to Art. 34 TFEU, any direct or indirect restrictions of the free 
movement of goods by the EU member states within the EU are 
prohibited. 
 
However, Art. 36 TFEU provides exceptions to this general 
prohibition. It provides that the provisions of Articles 34 TFEU “shall not 
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit 
justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the 
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or 
the protection of industrial and commercial property.” 137 
 
It is unchallenged that the latter term “industrial and commercial 
property” in this article covers “intellectual property”.138 Hence, according 
                                                             
135 Hemphill, Thomas “The Paradox of Patent Assertion Entities” (2013) The American. 
136 The German company “IPCom” for instance was founded by a German patent lawyer 
for the whole purpose of exploiting an old and huge patent portfolio which has been 
acquired from the German technology company Bosch. After acquiring said patent 
portfolio which mainly consisted of broad patents concerning basic cell phone technology 
IPCom sued the entire German mobile phone industry for infringement of its patents. 
Deutsche Telekom (Germany´s largest telecommunication company) alone paid several 
hundreds of million Euros to IPCom in the course of out of court settlements. See: 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/telekom-zahlt-hunderte-millionen-euro-an-
patent-troll-ipcom-a-909323.html.  
137 See Art. 36 TFEU; Foster: EU Law Directions 3e, Chapter 11, Online Resources 
Center, Oxford University Press, 
http://global.oup.com/uk/orc/law/eu/foster_directions3e/01student/questions/ch11/. 
138 Woods, Lorna, Watson Philippa EU Law (2012) 11th Edition p. 414. 
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to Art. 36 TFEU, prohibitions or restrictions on import and export of goods 
in transit justified on grounds on the protection of intellectual property are 
expressly tolerated and secured. Here one might follow from this 
regulation that law for the protection of intellectual property is absolute and 
cannot be restricted. However, this is only partly correct:  
 
Since the 1960s the ECJ has consistently differentiated between 
the existence and the exercise of intellectual property rights. In its early 
decision, Consten and Grundig vs. The Commission, the court already 
held that “Nevertheless, it is clear […] that whilst the treaty does not affect 
the existence of rights recognized by the legislation of a member state in 
matters of industrial property, yet the exercise of these rights may 
nevertheless, depending on the circumstances be affected by the 
prohibitions in the treaty.”139  
 
It, therefore, follows that only the existence of an intellectual 
property right like, for example, a patent is secured under EU law. In other 
words, it is guaranteed that the EU member states are free to set up an 
intellectual property system and that those regimes cannot be challenged. 
However, the exercise of such rights has to be in compliance with EU 
regulations. If they are not, they can be limited to the point where they are 
no longer contravening EU legislation and case law. Therefore, it is clear 
that, in general, EU competition law can restrict intellectual property rights 
as long as their exercise is in violation with it.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
139
ECJ Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc. Case 15/74 (1974) 
para. 7. 
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4.3 Art. 101 TFEU (ex. Art. 81 (1) EC Treaty) 
 
According to Art. 101 (1) TFEU (ex Art. 81 EC Treaty), all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between EU Member States 
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the internal market, are forbidden, unless 
the agreements fall under the exemptions of Art. 101 (3) TFEU.140 
 
The cartel prohibition, according to Art. 101 (1) TFEU, is applied if 
the exercise of a patent represents the subject, the means or the result of 
a cartel agreement.141 However, the amicable use of patents has, besides 
its anti-competitive effects, often also produced effects which are desirable 
and pro-competitive. This is the reason why the cartel prohibition of Art. 
101 (1) TFEU is limited by the exemption of Art. 101 (3) TFEU.142  
 
However, an intellectual property right like a patent right cannot be 
seen in itself as an “agreement” or a “coordination” in the sense of Art. 101 
(1) TFEU.  In fact, Art. 101 TFEU can be applied only if it is proven that the 
exercise of the intellectual property right has been the subject, the means 
or the result of a cartel agreement.143 The unilateral enforcement of patent 
rights as such can therefore usually not constitute an infringement against 
the prohibition of restrictive practices according to Art. 101 (1) TFEU, 
because of the lack of an agreement or other coordinative practices.144 
 
A different situation can be found in the exercise of patent rights by 
means of so called standard essential or standard relevant patents (SEPs) 
                                                             
140 Jones, Alison, Brenda, Sufrin EC Competition Law (2000) p. 87. 
141 Haedicke, Maximilian, Timmann Henrik Handbuch Patentrecht (Handbook Patent 
Law) (2012) sec. 1 para 99. 
142 Ibid. 
143 ECJ Sirena S.r.l.. v.Eda S.r.l. and Others Case 40/70 (1971) ECR 69. 
144 Walz, Axel ”Patentverletzungsklage im Lichte des Kartellrechts”(2013) GRUR Int. 
2013 p. 718. 
 
33 
 
which are analysed in detail in the remainder of this work.145 A formal 
standardization can be seen as such an agreement that according to the 
European Commission cannot be treated as anticompetitive only under 
certain conditions. Thus, the view of the Commission is that a restraint of 
competition can be assumed when the danger of a market power emerges 
out of the standardization agreement in the industry.146 
 
If the holder of SEP´s impedes the access to standardized 
technology in an anticompetitive way147, then the exercise of exclusive 
patent rights can be presented as a consequence of a cartel agreement 
and an infringement of Art. 101 (1) TFEU.  
 
 
4.4 Art. 102 TFEU (ex Art. 82 EC Treaty)  
 
According to Art. 102 TFEU, any abuse of a dominant position by one or 
more undertakings within the internal market or in a substantial part of it 
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far, as it 
may affect trade between Member States. 
 
Hence, Art. 102 AEU aims to achieve the control of market 
dominating companies. The purpose of the norm is to intervene, when 
there is no competition pressure any longer for single companies due to 
their market domination.148 The law has a corrective role in such a case 
and aims to preserve the operability of competition on the market.  
 
                                                             
145 See below p. 55. 
146 European Commission, Communication from the Commission — “Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
horizontal co-operation agreements” (2011) C 11/01 para. 257. 
147 Ibid. at para. 278. 
148 Fiala, Donatella Das Verhältnis zwischen Immaterialgüter- und Kartellrecht (The 
relation between cartel- and intellectual property law) (2006) (PhD Dissertation) p.39 et 
seq. 
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Art. 102 TFEU prohibits the abusive exploitation of a dominant 
position on the single market, i.e., on an essential part on the single 
market by one or several companies, provided that this can lead to 
interference of the trade between the member states. Unlike the monopoly 
prohibition, according to the US American cartel law (section 2 Sherman 
Act), Art. 102 TFEU is not against the market dominating position of a 
company as such, and in principle also not against the acquisition of a 
market dominant position. Solely the abusive exploitation of such a 
position on the relevant market is prohibited.149 One can therefore say that 
companies with a market dominant position must only be particularly 
careful when they operate on the market and they must ensure not to 
abuse their market power. 
 
Just like Art. 101 TFEU Art. 102 TFEU is directly applicable. That 
means that companies, which are discriminated or damaged by the 
abusive behavior of a market dominating company, can bring their case to 
a national court. It is not necessary that the commission or a responsible 
national competition office has determined the abuse prior to it. Art. 102 
TFEU is, therefore, self-executing. Furthermore, the commission is 
authorized to demand that the objectionable behavior is stopped. It can 
also impose fines, which it has often done in the past.150 
 
By nature, there is no possibility to be exempted from the ban of the 
Art. 102 TFEU. In other words, in case of an abusive behavior that can be 
attributed to a market dominating company the behavior is per se 
unacceptable and forbidden. The commission is not in the position to allow 
exceptions from the ban.151  
 
                                                             
149 Schwarze, Jürgen EU Kommentar (Commentary to EU Law) (2012) Art. 102 TFEU 
para.1-4.  
150 Ibid.  
151 Ibid.  
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The following sections of this chapter will explain the elements and 
requirements of Art. 102 TFEU in detail. 
 
 
4.4.1 The relevant market 
 
Art. 102 TFEU presumes that a company has a market dominating 
position. Answering the question of whether a company has a dominating 
position alone or together with other companies is a requirement for the 
differentiation of an objectively and geographically relevant market.152 To 
put it simply: in order to find out whether a company dominates the 
market, one must first ask the question, what is the market? Based on the 
defined market, one can determine whether the company dominates the 
market alone or in conjunction with other companies.153 
 
 
4.4.1.1 The relevant product market 
 
According to the legal practice of the European Court of Justice, all goods 
and services that are exchangeable with each other belong to the same 
relevant product market.154 The definition depends decisively on the 
functional exchangeability of the goods/services from the perspective of 
the opposite market side; in case of business markets is this, for instance, 
the consumer. The actual view of the purchaser is of importance here. A 
physical-technical or chemical identity is not necessary. This makes 
sense, as only products that compete with each other can be relevant in 
the sense of the competition law.  
 
                                                             
152 Ibid.  
153 Ibid.  
154 Case C- 6-72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v 
Commission of the European Communities (1973) ECR 215. para. 32; Rs Case C-85/76 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission (1979) ECR 461 para 28; Rs. C-7/97, Case 
C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG 
(1998) ECR I-7791 para. 33. 
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Determining a “sufficient degree of exchangeability” requires a 
judgmental observation. It should not only refer to the needs and the 
demand of the opposite market side that emerges out of the needs but 
also to the cross-elasticity of demand. Its analysis happens within the 
following experiment that is also known as a hypothetical monopolist 
test.155 This test assesses whether the already minor increase in price of a 
product A leads to shifting of demand to another product B. If this is the 
case, then there is a sufficient exchangeability of both products. The 
commission evaluates the cross-elasticity of demand within the so-
called SSNIP-Test (“small but significant non-transitory increase in 
price”).156 
 
One cannot conclude based on an intellectual property right-related 
exclusive patent right that this creates an own market at the same time in 
the sense of the competition law. In other words: a patent matches its own 
market only in the most seldom cases.157 
 
 
4.4.1.2 The relevant geographic market 
 
The relevant geographic market includes the area in which the relevant 
product is distributed. It must be sufficiently homogeneous and noticeably 
different from other markets, that is neighboring areas, based on its 
characteristics and various competition requirements.158 The area must be 
                                                             
155 Imenga, Ulrich, Mestmäcker Joachim-Ernst Wettbewerbsrecht Teil I (Competition Law 
Part I) (2012) Art. 102 para. 50. 
156 See Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law (1997) C 372/5 available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&num
doc=31997Y1209(01)&model=guicheti; See also Case T-427/08 CEAHR v Commission 
(2010) ECR II-5865 for the introduction of the SSNIP Test by the courts. 
157 Case T-30/89 Hilti Aktiengesellschaft v Commission of the European Communities 
(1990) II-00163 para 68; Fiala, Donatella Das Verhältnis zwischen Immaterialgüter- und 
Kartellrecht (The relation between cartel- and intellectual property law) (2006) (PhD 
Dissertation) p. 35. 
158 Case C-27/76 United Brands v Commission of the European Communities (1978) 
ECR 207. 
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an essential part of the European common market. The term “essential” 
does not only refer to the geographical size but rather to its economic 
significance. For example, due to its great economic standing, the harbor 
of the Italian city Genoa is to be seen as an essential part of the common 
market.159 
 
 
4.4.2 Market dominance 
 
After having identified the relevant market, one must evaluate, in a second 
step, whether the company holds a market dominant position on this 
particular market or not. 
 
The Treaty itself does not provide any definition of market 
“dominance”. but according to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
market dominance means: “A position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to 
an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers.”160 
 
The criteria of market structure, company structure and behavior of 
the company on the market are part of this observation.161 The market 
share of the company also plays a decisive role here and has at least an 
indicative effect. The European Court of Justice concludes, partly from 
especially high market shares of over 50%, that this is by implication the 
existence of a market dominating position.  
 
                                                             
159 Case C-179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova v Siderurgica (1991) ECR I-5889. 
160 Case C-27/76 United Brands v Commission of the European Communities (1978) 
ECR 207.para. 63, 66. 
161 Fiala, Donatella Das Verhältnis zwischen Immaterialgüter- und Kartellrecht (The 
relation between cartel- and intellectual property law) (2006) (PhD Dissertation) p. 37; 
Imenga, Ulrich, Mestmäcker Joachim-Ernst Wettbewerbsrecht Teil I (Competition Law 
Part I) (2012) Art. 102 para 73. 
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In the Akzo162 case the ECJ stated that: “With regard to market 
shares the Court has held that very large market shares are in 
themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the 
existence of a dominant position [...] That is the case where there is a 
market share of 50% and more”.163 
 
Other important criteria are, for example, the financial power of the 
company, its access to the buying and selling markets, the connections to 
other companies, the legal and actual barriers for the market access by 
competitors, the actual and potential competition by companies that are 
based in the relevant market, the capability of reorganizing the demand 
and supply to other goods or commercial activities or the possibility of the 
opposite market side to yield to other companies.164  
 
Intellectual property rights can support a market dominant position, 
but they themselves cannot effectuate it. Thus, the fact alone that a 
company possesses one or several patents for a specific technology does 
not implicate market dominance.165  
 
 
4.4.3 Abuse of a market dominant position 
 
A market dominant position per se does not lead to a breach of 
competition law, as it is often assumed. Hence, it is not forbidden to 
dominate a market. Only if a company abuses its market domination is a 
breach of competition law on the table. Therefore, one can say that market 
dominant companies are only subject to stricter requirements when 
                                                             
162 Case C-550/07 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Limited and Akcros Chemicals Limited -v- 
Commission of the European Communities (Akzo) (2010) I-8301. 
163 Under national German Competition Law market dominance is assumed at a market 
share of 40 % and more (see sec. 18 (4) GWB).  
164 Imenga, Ulrich, Mestmäcker Joachim-Ernst Wettbewerbsrecht Teil I (Competition Law 
Part I) (2012) Art. 102 para 73. 
165 Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/9 -Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) & Independent 
Television Publications Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission("Magill") (1995) ECR I-743. 
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conducting their business, as they weaken the competition already with 
their market domination.166 
 
The difficult demarcation between intellectual property rights on the 
one hand and competition law on the other hand takes place here. This is 
not about answering the question whether the mere ownership of an 
intellectual property right represents an abuse. It is also not about the 
abuse of an intellectual properly right itself. It is rather about the question 
whether the exercise of intellectual property rights by market dominating 
companies can represent, in individual cases, an abuse of their market 
dominant position.167 The European Court of Justice determines in its 
decision Hoffmann La Roche that it is only about the question whether an 
intellectual property right is used in the individual case as means for 
exploitation of already existing market dominance.168 On the other hand, 
this means that intellectual property rights are not “immune” against 
competition law. Intellectual property rights such as, for example, patent 
rights can hence be limited by competition law in particular cases.169  
 
In the following, the ECJ landmark cases Park vs. Davis and 
Sirena, Volvo vs. Veng and Circra vs. Renault will be examined in order to 
elaborate the European Court of Justices findings regarding the abusive 
exercise of intellectual property rights.  
 
 
4.4.3.1 Park vs. Davis and Sirena 
 
Provided the intellectual property holder actually holds a market dominant 
position (and this can be proven), the ECJ concluded in its cases Parke, 
                                                             
166 Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Baden-Industrie Michelin  v Commission of the 
European Communities (1983) ECR 3461 para 70. 
167 Fiala, Donatella Das Verhältnis zwischen Immaterialgüter- und Kartellrecht (The 
relation between cartel- and intellectual property law) (2006) (PhD Dissertation) p. 44. 
168 Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche v Centrafarm, (1978) ECR 1139. 
169 Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak v Commission of the European Communities (1990) ECR II-
309. 
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Davis & Co and Sirena that an abuse of such market dominant position 
cannot already be justified by the very fact that a intellectual property 
protected product is sold at a higher price than a corresponding, 
unprotected product.170 However, the price is not completely irrelevant. It 
can be an indication for an abuse, if it is especially high and objectively not 
justifiable.171 
 
Admittedly, the explanations of the ECJ in this judgment concerning 
a trademark infringement – in particular in regard to patent rights – should 
be perceived with great care. The ECJ has emphasized that a particular 
danger of artificial market partitioning is inherent to the exercise of 
trademark rights. However, this does not have to apply to patent rights. In 
addition, trademark rights are usually valid for an unlimited period of time 
provided those rights are regularly prolonged.172 This also does not apply 
to patents. 
 
 
4.4.3.2 Volvo vs.Veng and Cicra vs. Renault 
 
In the cases of Volvo v. Veng173 and  Cicra v. Renault174 concerning a 
design right, the ECJ corroborated the principle that the exercise of an 
intellectual property right is not to be objected on the merits, but that it can 
be forbidden when the requirements of Art. 102 TFEU are fulfilled. 
Furthermore, the ECJ defines both negatively and positively, in what 
cases an abuse cannot exist or, in an exceptional case, can. 
 
The ECJ emphasized, on the one hand, that the mere acquisition of 
an (intellectual property) right that is exclusively guaranteed by the legal 
system cannot be held as abusive means for the elimination of 
                                                             
170 Case C-24/67 Parke, Davis & Co v. Probel and Others (1968) ECR 55.  
171 Case C-40/70 Sirena S.r.l.. v.Eda S.r.l. and Others (1971) ECR 69. 
172 Case C-258/78 Nungesser v Commission Case (1982) ECR 2015. 
173 Case C-238/87 Volvo v Veng   (1988) ECR 06211. 
174 Case C-53/87  Cicra & Maxicar v Régie Renault  (1988) ECR 06039. 
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competition.175 The reason for this is the fact that the purpose of 
intellectual property rights must be to exclude third parties from the 
unauthorized use of protected objects. Organizing an intellectual property 
rights protection portfolio including the registration and acquisition of 
patent rights per se can therefore not constitute a breach of competition 
law. The view of the ECJ is that it is also up to market dominating 
companies to organize and expand their IP protection portfolios.176  
 
On the other hand, the ECJ refers explicitly to three case groups 
which can justify abusiveness in exceptional cases. In the cases of Volvo 
v. Veng and Cicra v. Renault, the ECJ took for granted such an 
abusiveness in the arbitrary refusal to deliver spare parts to independent 
service stations, in the inadequate price fixing of spare parts as well as in 
the abandoning of spare parts production for a specific model, although 
there were still many cars of this model running.177  
 
In addition, the exercise of intellectual property rights can, 
according to the ECJ, be abusive in aspects that are similar to the so 
called essential-facilities doctrine.178 
 
 
4.4.4 Essential facilities doctrine 
 
The essential facilities doctrine is a legal doctrine which describes a 
particular type of claim under competition laws.179 In general, it refers to a 
specific type of anti-competitive behavior in which a market dominant firm 
                                                             
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid; Walz, Axel ”Patentverletzungsklage im Lichte des Kartellrechts”(2013) GRUR Int. 
Beck Verlag p. 718. 
177 Case C-238/87 Volvo v Veng   (1988) ECR 06211; Case C-53/87  Cicra & Maxicar v 
Régie Renault  (1988) ECR 06039. 
178 Ibid. 
179 The first case to use the idea was United States v. Terminal Railroad Association 224 
U.S. 383 (1912), see also Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Currtis V. 
Trinko LLP (02-682) 540 U.S. (2004). 
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takes advantages of a "bottleneck" in a market to hinder competitors to 
enter the market.180  
 
Such conduct can constitute a breach of competition law according 
to Art. 102 (I) TFEU. The essential facilities doctrine is related to a claim 
for refusal to deal.181 The latter is expressed in an abusive refusal to deal 
regarding essential facilities for the access to upstream and downstream 
markets.182 Hence, a requirement for it is that a company has a market 
dominant position based on its sole possession or access to an essential 
facility. Although the access to this essential facility is indispensable for 
other competitors, as well in order to be able to offer goods and services 
on a neighboring market, it is refused by the possessor of this facility. 
Thus, the possessor of the essential facility can also dominate the 
neighboring market and exclude potential competitors from it based on its 
monopoly position in this regard.183 The accusation of abuse is, 
consequently, based on the exploitation of a market dominant position with 
regard to the essential facility. Such a conduct contradicts Art. 102 TFEU, 
whose purpose is to prevent the unnatural reinforcement of a market 
dominant position and its expansion to other markets.184  
 
The essential facilities doctrine originates from the American 
antitrust law, which has been a role model for the European competition 
law. The US Supreme Court enjoined in 1912 in the case United States 
                                                             
180 Troy, Daniel E. “Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facilities Doctrine” 
(1983) Columbia Law Review p. 441. 
181 Pitofsky, Robert and others “The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under United States 
Antitrust Law”(2002) Georgetown University Law Center available at: 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1342&context=facpub. 
182 Münchener Kommentar zum Europäischen und Deutschen Wettbewerbsrecht 
(Kartellrecht) (2014) Art. 82 EG para. 332; Emmerich, Volker Kartellrecht (Cartel Law) 
(2012) sec. 10, para. 35.; Böttcher, Matthias “Clearstream – Die Fortschreibung der 
Essential Facilities Doktrin im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht”(2011) Beiträge zum 
transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht Vol. 102 p. 6 
183 Ibid.  
184 
Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht Vol. II EG-KartR (Part 1) (2011) Art. 82 EG; 
Emmerich, Volker Kartellrecht (Cartel Law) (2012) sec. 10 para. 7;Böttcher, Matthias 
“Clearstream – Die Fortschreibung der Essential Facilities Doktrin im Europäischen 
Wettbewerbsrecht”(2011) Beiträge zum transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht Vol. 102 p. 6 
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vs. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis185 a contractual merger of 
railroad associations as possessors of essential infrastructure facilities for 
the regional railway system. The justification for this decision then was that 
the railroad companies would not have provided the required facilities for 
the railway system to other competitors on the same terms. The basis of 
the decision was the cartel ban in section 1, as well as the monopolization 
ban in section 2 of the Sherman Act which is part of the American 
antitrust-law. The monopolization ban according to section 2 of the 
Sherman act, that is unknown in the European competition law, prohibits 
obtaining and defending of a market dominating position by using 
inadequate means.186 
 
The essential facilities doctrine has meanwhile penetrated the 
European competition law as well, but the requirements in the USA and in 
the EU are different.187 
 
In Europe, it is commonly required for the application of the doctrine 
that – with regards to patents- the patent right holder refuses the granting 
the rights of use (licenses) to a third party, and the refusal prevents the 
emergence of a new product for which there is a potential consumer 
demand provided this refusal is unjustified, and it is to exclude any 
competition on a derived market.188  
 
The European Commission, for the first time, established the 
essential facilities doctrine in Europe with its Sea Link I and II189 decisions 
in the early 1990s. In these cases a port operator refused to open its port 
                                                             
185 United States v. Terminal Railroad Association 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
186 Böttcher, Matthias “Clearstream – Die Fortschreibung der Essential Facilities Doktrin 
im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht”(2011) Beiträge zum transnationalen 
Wirtschaftsrecht Vol. 102 p. 6. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health (2004) ECR I-5039 para. 52. 
189 Commission Decisions B&I Line plc v Sealink Harbours Ltd and Stena Sealink Ltd 
[1992] 5 CMLR 255; IV/34.689 Sea Containers v Stena Sealink – Interim Measures, 
(Commission Decision 94/19/EC of 21 December 1993, OJ 1994 L 15, 18.01.1994, pp. 
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to some shipping companies under fair and reasonable conditions. This 
behavior brought the Commission to the conclusion that the port – due to 
its importance for shipping – constituted an essential facility to which its 
operator has to give access to all vessels under fair conditions.  
 
However, the question whether the essential facilities should also 
be readily applied on intellectual property rights was controversial for a 
long time.190 However, the ECJ has clearly affirmed this question in 
several cases since.191 Already with the ECJ´s decision in Volvo v. 
Renault, where the court held that the exercise of intellectual property 
rights can constitute an abuse of a market dominant position, the court 
opened the door for the application of the essential facilities doctrine on 
intellectual property laws. It was only a logical step from the courts 
appraisal that intellectual property rights can infringe competition law to 
the conclusion that the essential facilities doctrine is also applicable to 
intellectual property rights like patents. 
 
The essential facilities doctrine has been further developed and 
applied to the refusal of granting licenses for intellectual property rights in 
the decisions of the European Court of Justice in the cases of Magill, 
Bronner and IMS Health as well as in the case of Microsoft. The relevant 
facts and findings of these cases are described below. 
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4.4.4.1 Magill Case 
 
In the case of Magill,192 the matter in dispute was the use of copyright 
protected TV channel information about the channel, day, hour and title of 
TV shows. Different TV channels were entitled to the copyrights of the 
information, which they were publishing in their own printed TV program 
guides.193  
 
The company Magill intended to publish a weekly comprehensive 
cross-channel TV program guide which combined the information of all TV 
channels in one single publication. Based on their copyrights, the TV 
channels allowed Magill to publish such information only in a very limited 
form.194 The channels prohibited Magill the publication of a comprehensive 
TV program guide and refused to grant Magill a respective license.  
 
The ECJ affirmed the abusiveness of the license refusal by the TV 
channels following the essential facilities thought:  
 
The ECJ saw the exceptional circumstances constituting an abusive 
behavior in the fact that the refusal of a license firstly referred to a product 
(TV channel information), whose delivery was indispensable for the 
exercise of the mentioned activity (printing a general TV program guide) 
and that this refusal prevented the appearance of a new product, for which 
there was a potential demand of consumers. Moreover, the ECJ 
considered the refusal of the licensing to be unjustified by matter-of-factly 
considerations and its purpose was to exclude any competition on the 
derived market.195  
 
                                                             
192 Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/9 -Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) & Independent 
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4.4.4.2 Bronner Case 
 
In the Bronner case196, the ECJ built upon its Magill decision and further 
clarified the individual requirements of the essential facilities doctrine. The 
case concerned the issue of abusiveness of the refusal of a magazine 
publisher, to grant a competitor, here the Oscar Bronner GmbH, access to 
its own, nationwide unique home delivery system for daily newspapers in 
Austria. At the core of the case was the question to what extent the Oscar 
Bronner GmbH needed access to the home delivery system of the 
competitive publisher to distribute its own daily newspaper and to what 
extent it is competition to this competitive publisher.197 The ECJ stated that 
a refusal of access to the relevant market for Bronner is not suitable to 
eliminate any competition on the daily newspaper market. Hence, solely 
the circumstance that it would be economically unprofitable for Oscar 
Bronner to establish its own home delivery system based on its 
significantly lower circulation was not sufficient to confirm an 
indispensability of the access to the home delivery system of the 
competitive publisher. Moreover, it should be impossible or unacceptable 
for every other publisher of daily newspapers out of technical, legal or 
economic obstacles to create such a home delivery system by itself or in 
cooperation with other companies.198 
 
Therefore, to answer the question whether access to an essential 
facility is indispensable for a competitor, one must also consider the 
objective possibilities of a competitor in the economic position of the 
possessor of the essential facility. This objective test leading to a 
restrictive handling of the criterion of indispensability of the access to 
                                                             
196 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG (1998) 
ECR I-7791. 
197 Ibid.; Walz, Axel ”Patentverletzungsklage im Lichte des Kartellrechts”(2013) GRUR Int. 
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essential facilities is based on the idea of the investment and innovation 
protection.199 As far as essential facilities go back to one's own 
investments and innovations, the enforced opening of these facilities leads 
to a decrease of the incentives in the competition in favor of the 
competitors. For this reason access to a facility can only be claimed if 
objective obstacles exist, which do not only depend on one's own 
economic success on the relevant market. Otherwise, the application of 
the essential facilities doctrine would effectively decrease competition. In 
the discussed case it was not enough that resorting to other distribution 
ways would have been less economically favorable for Oscar Bronner 
GmbH, as it is not spirit and purpose of the essential facilities doctrine to 
create competitive advantages for (prospective) competitors. Moreover, 
the existence of an actual or potential substitute, even though it may be 
less convenient, usually excludes the claims for an access to an essential 
facility.200 
 
 
4.4.4.3 IMS Health Case 
 
The ECJ continued the application of the essential facilities doctrine on 
intellectual property rights in its IMS Health decision201 a few years later. 
The US company IMS Health is the leading supplier of information for the 
healthcare industry. IMS is a market leader worldwide, including Germany. 
In the late 1990s two other companies, a US company and a Belgium 
company, tried to enter the German market with similar services to 
compete with IMS Health. The problem was that IMS health processed 
and presented the information to the health care companies according to a 
specific system, called the “1860 brick system”. This system had become 
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a de facto “industry standard”202 and was protected by IMS health 
copyrights. For its competitors there was no way to circumvent this 
standard because all health care companies were working according to it. 
They were willing to accept new information suppliers but it was highly 
unrealistic that the companies would accept having to use a different 
standard. 
 
Essentially, the ECJ used the decision IMS Health to confirm and 
further substantiate its findings in the cases Bronner and Magill. However, 
the ECJ did weaken some of the requirements it had laid down in the 
Bronner decision. For instance, the ECJ confirmed the requirements laid 
down in the Bronner case for a behaviour that violates competition law 
resulting from the denial of a licence. However, the ECJ did no longer refer 
to the aspect that a license denial would have to exempt any competition 
on a specific secondary market; instead it referred to an exemption of any 
competition on a concrete, potential or a hypothetical market.203 It is also 
doubtful whether the disputed products of the IMS Health competitors 
were actually “new” products in the sense of the Magill judgment, even 
though the competitors' products did offer some advantages in comparison 
to the IMS Health product. Here too, it is unclear whether the European 
Court of Justice has loosened the previously posed requirement that the 
license denial would have to prevent a new product.204 
 
 
 
                                                             
202 However, this was not a technical standard. The standard referred only to the way the 
information was processed and presented.  
203 Reynolds, Michael, Best Christopher “Article 102 and Innovation: The journey since 
Microsoft” (2012) 
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4.4.4.4 Microsoft Case 
 
In 1998, shortly after the ECJ´s Magill decision, the US computer 
corporation Sun Microsystems Inc. filed a complaint with the European 
Commission. Sun Microsystems accused Microsoft of abusing its 
dominant position in the supply of PC operation systems, namely 
Microsoft´s Windows. Sun argued that Microsoft unlawfully abused its 
dominant position by refusing to provide Sun with necessary information to 
develop its own software which would be able to interoperate with PC´s 
running Windows.205  
 
The Commission took this opportunity to start an investigation and a 
market enquiry about Microsoft´s market behavior and issued several 
Statements of Objections against Microsoft addressing the interoperability 
of Microsoft´s operating systems as well as its bundling of Windows Media 
Player with its Windows system. 
 
The Commission followed Sun´s arguments and came to the 
conclusion that Microsoft indeed held a market dominant position with its 
operating system Windows. Furthermore, the Commission found that 
Microsoft had abused this position by refusing to disclose necessary 
information to its competitors to produce work group server operating 
systems capable of interoperating with the Windows operation system:206  
 
“Consequently, [the Commission] said that Microsoft’s refusal to 
supply interoperability information was abusive because 1) interoperability 
information is needed by competitors in the market for work group server 
operating systems to viably stay on the market: 2) Microsoft’s conduct 
involved a disruption of previous levels of supply; 3) there was ‘a risk of 
                                                             
205 Ibid at p. 9. 
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eliminating all competition in the work group server operating system 
market’; 4) the refusal to supply had the consequence of ‘preventing 
innovation in the work group server market and of diminishing consumers’ 
choice by locking them into a homogeneous Microsoft’s solution;’ and 5) 
the refusal was not objectively justified because on balance ‘negative 
impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate was 
outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation of the whole 
industry (including Microsoft).”207 
 
 
4.4.4.5 The ECJ´s requirements in detail 
 
The ECJ´s requirements for the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine set out in the above mentioned judgements may be summarised 
as follows:  
 
 
4.4.4.5.1 Market dominant position of the right holder 
 
Even in the case of a refusal to grant a license to a third party, the market 
domination cannot result solely from the possession of an intellectual 
property right. Here, too, the general competition law criteria apply. That 
means the relevant market has to be defined and the position of the rights 
holder on this market has to be judged based on market share, market 
access barriers and other competitive criteria such as market conditions 
and market dynamics.208 This is to be applied on the market, on which the 
rights holder denies the grant of the license.209  
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4.4.4.5.2 The demand of a “new” product 
 
According to the ECJ´s judgments it is necessary that the refusal to grant 
a license prevents the appearance of a new product, for which there is a 
potential consumer demand.210 Certainly, what can be understood under a 
“new” product can be argued. Different interpretations are possible here. 
One could assume, for example, that a new product in the sense of 
competition law exists only if a new market is opened up with this product. 
On the other hand, a new product can already exist, if its individual 
features make it different from the product of the intellectual property rights 
holder. Finally, a new product can exist if its individual features make it 
different from other products in general which includes products from third 
parties that are already offered on the market.211 
 
The spirit and purpose of European competition law per se speaks 
for a product innovation definition that is opposed to a purely market 
oriented definition. The European competition law intends not only to 
enable the opening of new markets, but also as wide as possible product 
selection for consumer in general.212 If competition law, however, protects 
the product versatility as well, the interpretation of the term “new product” 
cannot depend solely on the opening of a new market. A product-related 
approach must be selected in this case. Therefore, the protection purpose 
of competition law suggests that the combination of new product features 
in an already well-known product suffices.213  
 
This interpretation corresponds as well to the verdict of the 
European Court of First Instance in the case of Microsoft. In this case, the 
court explicitly confirmed that a product can be defined as new if it 
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contains essential elements that can be traced back to the efforts of the 
license seeker.214 Therefore, if the license seeker can prove that his 
products bring a surplus value to the consumers based on their own 
specific features, especially if the corresponding features are advertised 
as sales arguments, then it can be assumed that it is a new product.215 
According to the court it is decisive, whether the arguable intellectual 
property rights (in the case of Microsoft copyright protected interface 
information) can be “implemented in numerous different and innovative 
ways”216 and hence are not a sole copy of the products of the rights holder 
that are already on the market, but “will be distinguished from [them] with 
respect to parameters which consumers consider important.”217 
 
 
4.4.4.5.3 Elimination of any competition on the derived market 
 
In addition to the requirement that the right holder’s refusal to grant a 
license prohibits a new product, the ECJ requires that the refusal is 
suitable to eliminate any competition on the derived market. In doing so, 
one must be able to differentiate between two different production levels 
whose interrelation is based on the upstream product being an 
indispensable element for the delivery of the downstream product.218 
 
It is not always easy to draw a clear distinction between upstream 
and downstream markets. According to the jurisdiction of the European 
courts, a distinct upstream market exists if the product, to which the 
license pursuer seeks access, is indispensable for the operation of the 
license pursuer on the derived market.219  
 
                                                             
214 Case T-201/04 Microsoft (2007) ECR II-3601 paras. 626, 643. 
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The Advocate General Tizzano proposed, for the indispensability in 
the case of  IMS Health, a two-levels check. It is crucial to determine 
whether firstly “there are substitute inputs, which may be used to operate 
(more or less effectively) on the market in question,” and secondly, 
whether “there are obstacles of a technical, legislative or financial nature 
which may make it impossible or unreasonably difficult for any undertaking 
seeking to operate on that market to create other inputs possibly in 
conjunction with other operators.”220 The ECJ has not commented on this 
explicitly, but has left the evaluation of the indispensability to the national 
courts.221  
 
If the above mentioned requirements are met, then the 
Commission's view is that one can frequently assume that the license 
refusal eliminates effective competition on the derived market.222The ECJ 
has insofar emphasized in the case of Microsoft that it must not be proven 
that there has been no or practically no competition any longer on the 
particular market.223 Otherwise functioning market structures cannot be 
protected especially in dynamic competition environments. In fact, the 
competition law would protect in that case only a minimal rest of the 
remaining competition. In the case of an injunctive relief the requirements 
are anyway typically to be proven. They are in their nature directed 
towards a complete elimination of the concerned company from the 
competition.224 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
220 Opinion of the Advocat General Tizziano (2004) I-5042 – IMS Health para 80. 
221 Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health (2004) ECR I-5039. 
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4.4.5 Conclusions 
 
Whereas Art. 101 TFEU is concerned with competition-constraining 
agreements and agreed-upon behaviour patterns among several 
companies, Art. 102 TFEU bans the one-sided abusive exploitation of a 
market-dominating position on the Common Market or an essential part of 
it.  
 
The regulation includes a directly invoked ban on abusive practices, 
which applies to all market dominant companies. The ban on abusive 
practices of Art. 102 TFEU plays a key role for controlling competition-
relevant behaviour of patent holders through competition law.225 
Altogether, an enhancement of the competition law abuse control begins 
to show, but its limits are in flux. In practice, cases are of particular 
importance in which the holder of market-dominating position secured by 
patents or other property rights denies the access to protected technology 
to a license seeker. As a result, the license seeker is prevented to 
compete with the property right holder. 
 
The market-dominating rights holder can basically decide freely 
whom he wants to grant a license to. But the license denial can under 
certain circumstances be considered as a case of unfair hindrance of 
competitors and anticompetitive behavior, according to the principles of 
the essential facilities doctrine.226 Consequently, such an abuse of a 
market dominating position can lead to a claim for granting a compulsory 
license to the license seeker.227 According to the prevailing opinion, this 
claim for granting a compulsory license directly follows from Art. 102 
AEUV.228  
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CHAPTER 5: STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS229 
 
As already mentioned above, the problem of an abuse of a market 
dominant position according to Art. 102 TFEU is present particularly in so-
called standard-relevant or standard-essential patents (SEPs), which are 
patents that refer to a particular industry standard. 
 
Therefore, there has recently been a discussion especially in 
Europe about the question how to deal with the abusive exercise of 
standard relevant patents in the course of patent infringement 
proceedings.  
 
First of all, this chapter will therefore explain what exactly industry 
standards and standard essential patents are before analysing the so 
called FRAND objection in patent infringement proceedings. The FRAND 
objection particularly refers to the abuse of a dominant position by 
exercising SEPs.  
 
 
5.1 Industry standards 
 
An industry standard (or short: standard) is a technical standard 
contributing to standardized and compatibility-technical products. Because 
of the multitude of technical products on the market and the rapid technical 
development such standards are nowadays of immense significance. For 
example, the USB standard guarantees that every “USB slot“ on a laptop 
or desktop computer – regardless from which manufacturer – is equipped 
in the same way and that every USB flash drive can be read and written 
on by any computer when inserted into such a slot. 
                                                             
229 This chapter partly draws from an Assignment written by the author of this thesis in 
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There are three different kinds of formation of a standard. Firstly, 
the state can determine a standard with laws or other regulations. 
Secondly, de facto standards or quasi standards can develop over time. 
Thirdly, companies can contribute to the development of a standard by 
participating in associations (e.g., in 1992, the standard SDRAM was 
created by JEDEC, or the mobile telephone system standard GSM or 
UMTS by ETSI).230 Setting a standard should, for instance, achieve a 
unification of goods or methods. Accordingly, certain minimum standards 
and compatibilities are determined in this process. The consumer might 
regard compatibilities as a matter of course, but in a market undergoing 
such a quick change like the software and hardware industry, compatibility 
can be only achieved when a specific norm has been determined.231  
 
It is obvious that patent protection on the one hand and standard 
setting on the other can be difficult to combine: Only when the patent-
holding companies agree with each other a standard can be set. For 
instance, setting the UMTS standard almost failed in the mid-80s because 
U.S.-based company Qualcomm, which held several patents for the UMTS 
technology, threatened not to grant any licenses in case of setting a 
standard. At the last minute, however, Qualcomm agreed to mutual 
license conditions as well as a reciprocal exchange of technologies. Only 
so could the standard UMTS be set.232 
 
This case shows how problematic the relationship between patents 
and standards can be, before specific industry standards can be specified 
at all. The patent right protects the patent holder and his intellectual 
property. Industry standards, on the other hand, facilitate competition, 
benefit the consumers, and often promote the development of smaller 
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companies as well, which have less financial means at their disposal.233 
Another problem is added to the already problematic relationship between 
competition law and patent law with the industry standard, which 
aggravates this relationship further on. 
 
Furthermore, a critical point about the standard setting is that when 
a standard is set only those patents become well-known, whose holders 
have taken part in the settlement of the technical norm. The patents of 
smaller companies or from companies, which are not members in these 
standard setting organisations, that is, companies, which conceal their 
patents, remain mostly hidden and are discovered only when the standard 
is released and used by market participants.234 
 
In light of special know-how requirements in the high-tech industry it 
is virtually impossible to appoint one single organization for the 
standardization procedure of all technological areas. Therefore, a great 
number of standardization organizations were established worldwide over 
time.  
 
Companies interested in standard setting and their active 
participation in developing standards can join standardization 
organizations. However, a membership obliges members to work towards 
developing a standard, to disclosing existing own patents, i.e., such that 
have been already submitted to the best of knowledge, and to grant 
licenses to license seekers according to the so-called FRAND (fair 
reasonable and non-discriminatory) conditions.235 
 
Well-known standards are, for instance, the ETSI´s GSM standard 
or 3GGP's already mentioned UMTS standard. The latter is a current 
mobile communications standard used worldwide, that in comparison to 
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older standards, e.g. the European GSM standard, provides a higher and 
faster data transmission rate. Each modern mobile phone must be UMTS 
compatible, if it is to remain marketable in order to be able to make phone 
calls in the corresponding UMTS mobile communications networks.  
 
Since the UMTS technology has been patented, every company 
which wants to produce and/or put on the market UMTS-compatible 
mobile phones, is forced to use patented technology of third parties and 
thus depends on a license granted by the patent holder(s) to use this 
technology. If the holder of standard-relevant patents refuses to grant a 
license to a competitor such refusal acts de facto as a market access 
barrier and the competitor is only left with two choices: Either to refrain 
from producing and marketing an UMTS-compatible mobile phone or to 
start producing and marketing a product that infringes patents for UMTS 
technology. In the second case, of course, this will likely result in patent 
infringement proceedings and claims for damages and an injunctive relief. 
 
In order to remove market access and participation barriers caused 
by licence refusals, German and other courts around the world have 
developed a compulsory license defense under competition law known as 
the FRAND objection.236 If the holder of so-called standard-essential 
patents (SEP) refuses to grant a license to third parties, the third party can 
defend itself in later patent infringement proceedings against the claims of 
the patent proprietor under certain conditions, using the FRAND 
objection.237  
 
In the following, this thesis will look at European and German 
precedents in order to determine general principles if and under what 
circumstances the FRAND objection can successfully be invoked in patent 
infringement proceedings.  
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5.1.1 The decision “Orange-Book Standard” of the German Federal 
Court of Justice 
 
In relation to the numerous infringement cases in different countries about 
SEPs, the requirements and limits of the FRAND objection are especially 
controversial and still not fully clarified. Especially the scope of the FRAND 
objection was controversial for many years until the German Federal Court 
of Justice (BGH) provided some additional clarity in 2009: In its verdict 
“Orange-Book Standard”238 the Federal Court of Justice decided that the 
defendant in patent infringement proceedings can defend itself against the 
legal action of the patent proprietor by using the so FRAND objection 
provided that the patent owners refusal to grant a license constitutes an 
abuse of a market dominant position according to the above mentioned 
ECJ´s general principles. As a consequence the defendant can demand 
the granting of a license under competition law.239 
 
While this was already determined in the earlier “Standard-
Spundfass (engl. Standard Barell with Screw Cap)”240 decision of the 
Federal Court of Justice in 2004, the Federal Court of Justice made a final 
and concluding decision here that a compulsory license defence under 
competition law can also be raised against an injunctive relief according to 
section 139 (1) German Patent Act. 
 
The Federal Court of Justice's senate has supported its view 
dogmatically on the Latin principle “Dolo agit, qui petit, quod statim 
redditurus est (in general: a claim is raised in bad faith, if the claimed 
subject matter is subject to a counterclaim for immediate return).241 This 
legal rule dates back to the Roman lawyer Iulius Paulus, who lived at the 
end of the second and the beginning of the third century AD. Paulus' 
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statement had been registered twice in the Digest, a compendium of 
fragments from the works of classic lawyers by order of the Roman 
emperor Justinian.242 This principle is also based in the German law, more 
specifically in section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB).243 Based on 
section 242 of the German Civil Code, the Senate of the Federal Court of 
Justice (BGH) assumes that the patent holder cannot ask the court for an 
injunction, if he demands with the injunction something what he would 
have to grant back immediately (i.e. in the process of a compulsory license 
according to competition law). 
 
However, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) mapped out important 
and very strict procedural requirements that must exist for the FRAND 
objection to be successful in patent infringement proceedings.244 First of 
all, the license seeker must have given an unconditional offer for signing a 
license agreement to the patent holder and proposed conditions that the 
patent holder cannot reject without infringing upon his duties according to 
competition law. Thus, an offer under certain conditions, for instance, is 
not sufficient according to the court. 
 
Furthermore, the license seeker must – provided that he has 
already used the patented technology – adhere to the license conditions 
he has offered and act in accordance to the proposed license agreement. 
The license seeker particularly has to pay or deposit license fees 
according to the agreement.245 However, the Federal Court of Justice did 
not have to deal with the question of what conditions the license seeker 
can demand in content.  
 
Due to these high procedural obstacles the Federal Court of Justice 
has set, the FRAND objection has hardly ever been successfully used in 
                                                             
242 See Charwath Philipp , Römisches Recht (Roman Law) (2011) p.411. 
243 See Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2012) Sec 242 para. 408. 
244 Verhauwen, Axel “Goldener Orange-Book-Standard am Ende?“ (Is the golden Orange 
Book Standard at the end“) (2013) GRUR p. 558. 
245 BGH  GRUR 2009 p. 694 – Orange-Book-Standard. 
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patent infringement proceedings after the Orange-Book standard decision. 
Also, several questions concerning the practical implementation of the 
FRAND defense in court were left unanswered by the Federal Court of 
Justice.246 For instance, one of the requirements of the compulsory license 
defense is the submission of an acceptable offer of the license seeker to 
the patent holder.247 Since the license seeker must act in good faith 
according to the Federal Court of Justice, this offer must be made before 
the patented technology has been used by the defendant and license 
seeker. Even though it can certainly be desirable from a practical point of 
view that the license seeker contacts the patent holder before he starts 
using the patented technology, this means that making a retrospective 
offer during patent infringement proceedings is in principle not possible.248 
However, a requirement for such a previous offer is that the license seeker 
was fully informed from the beginning and must inter alia have known the 
patent situation. Only in this case the license seeker is able make an effort 
to get a license and to develop an acceptable offer to the patent owner. It 
is debatable what demands must be made regarding such an element of 
awareness. It also remains disputable what should be done if the license 
seeker is not certain whether his product falls within the scope of the 
patent in dispute.249 Since the Federal Court of Justice demands that the 
license seeker's offer must be made by all means before the process,250 it 
strips the license seeker of the possibility, for example, to make an offer 
for a license agreement to the patent holder only under the condition that 
the license seeker's product falls within the scope of the patent or under 
the condition that the patent is valid.251 
 
                                                             
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Maume, Philipp, Tapia, Claudia “Der Zwangslizenzeinwand ein Jahr nach Orange-
Book-Standard – Mehr Fragen als Antworten“ (2010) GRUR Int. p. 923; Verhauwen, Axel 
“Goldener Orange-Book-Standard am Ende?“ (2013) GRUR p. 558. 
249 What quite often happens in practice. In many cases only patent infringement 
proceedings before court ascertain whether a specific product or process falls within the 
scope of the patent in suit or not. 
250 BGH  GRUR 2009 p. 694 – Orange-Book-Standard. 
251 Maume, Philipp, Tapia, Claudia „Der Zwangslizenzeinwand ein Jahr nach Orange-
Book-Standard – Mehr Fragen als Antworten“ (2010) GRUR Int. p. 923. 
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Moreover, some commentators have criticized that the Federal 
Court of Justice accepted only “adequate” offers of the license seeker.252 
However, it remains unsettled what qualifies as “adequate” as this will vary 
depending on the economic circumstances of a specific industry. 
According to the Federal Court of Justice, the court can limit itself to the 
decision that a sufficient amount has been deposited.253 The assessment 
of the adequacy of the offer that the license seeker has made is not 
mentioned any further. This is remarkable because making an adequate 
offer is a condition for the compulsory license defense and can be 
substituted only under certain conditions with a stipulation by the patent 
holder.254  
 
 
5.1.2 European Commission: Willingness to negotiate sufficient? 
 
The European Commission advanced a different view in the case of 
Samsung v. Motorola.255 Indeed, according to the Commission's opinion, 
injunctive reliefs represent legitimate remedies for the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. Only in exceptional cases should the request 
for an injunctive relief fail because of competition law limits.256 
 
According to the Commission, such an exception exists in the case 
of a patent lawsuit concerning a standard essential patent, for which the 
patent proprietor has given a so called FRAND commitment257 and when 
                                                             
252 Ibid; Verhauwen, Axel “Goldener Orange-Book-Standard am Ende?“ (2013) GRUR p. 
558. 
253 BGH  GRUR 2009 p. 694 – Orange-Book-Standard. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Press Release of the European Commission: “Antitrust: Commission sends Statement 
of Objections to Samsung on potential misuse of mobile phone standard-essential 
patents”(2012) IP/12/1448, see also Press Release of the European Commission “Anti-
Trust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on potential 
misuse of mobile phone standard-essential patents – Questions and Answers “(2012) 
IP/13/406. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Standard organizations like ETSI and others typically demand so called FRAND 
commitments from intellectual property right holders. In other words, FRAND 
commitments or declarations are made to the standard organizations, but the licensee 
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the license seeker is willing to negotiate about a license under FRAND 
conditions. In summary, three requirements must be met for the 
compulsory license defense in patent infringement proceedings according 
to the Commission's view: (1) The patent in suit must be a standard-
essential patent; (2) the patent holder has given a FRAND commitment; 
and (3) the license seeker must have proven that he is willing to 
negotiate.258 
 
Hence, the Commission formulated much lower demands on the 
compulsory license defence under competition law than the German 
Federal Court of Justice. In essence, it suffices when the patent in suit is 
standard-essential and the defendant is ready to negotiate for a license 
 
The European Commission’s opinion conforms with the assessment 
of other institutions. In fact, the Commission itself even states, in its Q&A 
catalogue dated 21.12.2012, that is has formed its preliminary legal 
concept in close cooperation with the leading U.S. competition law 
authorities.259 In the US, the enforcement of an injunctive relief from a SEP 
in addition to a FRAND statement from a license-willing patent user is 
simply not possible. In fact, the enforcement of an injunctive relief is not 
pursued there either if the demanding patent user of the SEP is ready to 
negotiate. An example for this is Google's concluded arrangement with the 
FTC (Federal Trade Commission) of the European Commission, according 
to which Google withdrew the injunction claims from the disputed SEPs. In 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(users of the norm) must be able to rely on them. See for more detailed information about 
FRAND commitments: Chappatte, Philippe, “FRAND Commitments the Case for Antitrust 
Intervention”(2009) European Competition Journal p. 319: 
http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/1428378/frand_commitments_the_case_for_anti
trust_intervention.pdf. 
258 Press Release of the European Commission: “Antitrust: Commission sends Statement 
of Objections to Samsung on potential misuse of mobile phone standard-essential 
patents”(2012) IP/12/1448. 
259 Press Release of the European Commission “Anti-Trust: Commission sends 
Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on potential misuse of mobile phone 
standard-essential patents – Questions and Answers “(2012) IP/13/406. 
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this case as well the negotiation readiness of the potential license holder is 
taken into consideration.260 
 
 
5.1.3 Düsseldorf Regional Court refers five questions to European 
Court of Justice  
 
Following these divergences between the Commission's EU law-based 
assessment and the Federal Court of Justice's “Orange-Book standard” 
decision, the District Court Düsseldorf, in 2013, posed five open-ended 
questions to the European Court of Justice.261 The District Court 
Düsseldorf, together with the Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf, belongs 
to the most frequented patent infringement courts in Europe.262 
 
The five questions the Düsseldorf Regional Court referred to the 
ECJ to answer are as follows:  
 
“1. Does a standard essential patent (SEP) owner who declared 
himself willing, vis-à-vis a standard-setting organization, to grant a license 
to all comers on FRAND terms, abuse his dominant market position if he 
seeks injunctive relief from a court of law against a patent infringer despite 
the infringer having declared himself willing to negotiate such a license  
or  
is it a requirement for the presumption of abusive conduct that the infringer 
has made a binding offer to the SEP owner on terms that the SEP owner 
cannot refuse without treating the infringer unfairly or discriminatorily and 
[furthermore requires that] the infringer, in anticipation of the license he is 
                                                             
260 Verhauwen, Axel “Goldener Orange-Book-Standard am Ende?“ (2013) GRUR p. 558. 
261 LG Düsseldorf (2013) GRUR-RR p. 196.  
262 See report on Fish & Richardson LLP: 
http://www.fr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Focus%20Europe.Mannheim%20Steamroller
-German%20City%20Aims%20to%20be%20Fastest.%20Peterreins.%20January% 
202013.pdf. 
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seeking, already complies with his contractual obligations with respect to 
past acts of infringement?  
 
2. In the event that a presumption of abuse of a dominant market 
position may already result from the infringer's willingness to negotiate:  
Does Art. 102 TFEU involve specific requirements for said willingness to 
negotiate in substantive and/or chronological terms? Can such a 
presumption be based merely on the infringer's (oral) declaration in broad 
and general terms of his willingness to enter into negotiations or does 
such a presumption require that the infringer has indeed entered into 
negotiations, such as by, for example, communicating terms and 
conditions under which he is prepared to conclude a license agreement?  
 
3.  In the event that the [infringer's] submission of a binding offer to 
conclude a license agreement is a requirement for an abuse of a dominant 
market position: Does Art. 102 TFEU involve specific substantive and/or 
chronological requirements with respect to such an offer? Does the offer 
have to set forth all of the commercial terms that in accordance with 
relevant industry practice are usually set forth in such license 
agreements? Can the offer be conditioned upon actual use and/or validity 
of the SEP-in-suit?  
 
4. In the event that the infringer's [precontractual] fulfilment of 
obligations arising from the requested license is a requirement for an 
abuse of a dominant market position: Does Art. 102 TFEU involve 
particular requirements with respect to such acts of fulfilment? Is the 
infringer required, in particular, to make disclosures relating to past acts of 
infringement and/or to pay [precontractual] royalties? Can an obligation to 
pay [precontractual] royalties also be fulfilled by giving security? 
 
5. Do the requirements for the presumption of abuse of a dominant 
market position by an SEP holder also apply to other remedies for patent 
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infringement (disclosures relating to past infringement, recall [of infringing 
products from distribution channels], damages)?”263 
 
In essence, the courts first question is whether the willingness to 
negotiate per se is sufficient to allow the defendant to rise the FRAND 
defense against the patent owners action or whether the “Orange-Book 
standard” criteria of the Federal Court of Justice should be met. The 
court's second question refers to a definition i.e. paraphrasing of the 
patent infringer's sufficient willingness to negotiate. The third question 
addresses the regulatory span of an “Orange-Book standard” license offer. 
The fourth question handles in what way the patent infringer must offer a 
payment or a security deposit. The fifth question is whether the conditions 
applying to the injunctive relief also apply to other claims such as, for 
example, damage claims.  
 
 
5.1.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The Regional Court’s initiative to seek clarity from the ECJ regarding the 
FRAND objection is laudable. Infringement lawsuits form standard-
essential patents are brought to courts internationally and parallel in 
various countries so a harmonized approach on the European level in 
regard to the legitimacy of the FRAND objection at the interface between 
patent law and competition law is desirable. Ultimately, this benefits the 
holders of standard-essential patents as well as third parties which are 
seeking licenses.  
 
Hopefully, the European Court of Justice will, on the one hand, 
soften the German approach based on the Orange-Book standard 
                                                             
263 LG Düsseldorf (2013) GRUR-RR 2013 p. 196; Translation by Höhne, Christof, 
Kamlah, Dietrich, Lunze, Anja, “What does it take to be FRAND” (2013), Taylor 
Wessing LLP. http://www.taylorwessing.com/de/news-insights/details/what-does-it-
take-to-be-frand-2013-04-08.html. 
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decision of the Federal Court of Justice, because the past years have 
shown that these criteria are too rigid and therefore, can be hardly used 
successfully.264 In other words: The German court requirements are too 
“patent owner friendly”. Since the exercise of SEPs can justify an abuse of 
a market-dominant position it is appropriate to better protect other 
(potential) market participants. On the other hand, it is hoped that the 
European Court of Justice limits the present view of the European 
Commission and other European courts. It goes too far to grant the patent 
infringer the compulsory license defense under competition law in patent 
infringement proceedings just because he shows a “willingness to 
negotiate”, expressed in whatever manner. To allow the FRAND objection 
so easily unjustifiably weakens the patent holders’ position and opens the 
floodgates for abusive behavior by the defendant.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: THE RELATION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
At present there are only a limited number of South African cases which 
are particularly concerned with the relation between intellectual property 
and competition law. The problem of lawsuits concerning standard 
relevant patents has not been decided by South African courts yet. 
However the most important South African cases will be analysed in this 
chapter after taking a closer look especially at the South African abuse of 
dominance provisions. 
 
 
                                                             
264 Verhauwen, Axel “Goldener Orange-Book-Standard am Ende?“ (Is the golden Orange 
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6.1 Abuse of dominance provisions in the South African Competition 
Act 
 
Provisions against the abuse of market dominance were introduced in 
South Africa in 1998 in Chapter II Part B of the South African Competition 
Act. Although these provisions borrow from existing law of other 
jurisdictions, especially the EU and the US, they nonetheless differ.265 
Currently, there is relatively little South African case law on the abuse 
provisions, and important questions remain unanswered.266  
 
Provided the regulations about the abuse of a market-dominating 
position are used according to section 3 and 6 of the Competition Act, the 
question arises whether a company is market-dominating according to 
section 7 of the Competition Act.267 Dominance is defined by market share 
and market power.268 If it turns out that a company dominates the market, 
then its behaviour must be evaluated according to section 8 and 9. The 
following behaviour patterns are forbidden according to the South African 
competition law, although in most cases it is also required that the 
matching behaviour has negative effects on the competition:269 
 
 Excessive pricing;270 
 refusing to give a competitor access to an essential facility;271 
 conduct that impedes or prevents others from entering, or expanding 
in, a market;272 
 requiring a supplier or customer not to deal with a competitor;273 
 refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor;274 
                                                             
265 Sutherland, Philip, Kemp, Katharine and others Competition Law of South Africa (last 
updated 2012) 7.1. 
266 Ibid at 7.1. 
267 Ibid at 7.4. 
268 OECD “Competition Law and Policy in South Africa” (2003) p. 24 available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/13/2958714.pdf; Sutherland, Philip, Kemp, Katharine 
and others Competition Law of South Africa (last updated 2012) 7.4. 
269 Ibid. at 7.4. 
270 Sec. 8 (a). 
271 Sec. 8 (b). 
272 Sec. 8 (c). 
273 Sec. 8 (d) (i). 
274 Sec. 8 (d) (ii). 
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 tying;275 
 predatory pricing;276 
 buying up scarce supply;277 
 and price discrimination.278 
 
The prohibitions of excessive pricing and refusal to grant access to 
an essential facility are governed by section 8 (a) and 8 (b) and classified 
by the courts as “per se provisions”. They therefore neither require proof of 
an anticompetitive effect nor permit a pro-competitive defence. E.g., 
excessive pricing by a market dominant entity in South Africa is per se 
prohibited by section 8 (a) of the Competition Act. A case by case analysis 
does not take place here.279  
 
By contrast, section 8 (d) is not classified as a per se prohibition. 
This section lists 5 different market behaviours which are only deemed as 
anticompetitive if the specific market behaviour has an anti competitive 
effect in each and every individual case. In addition, the respondent can 
defend himself with the argument that his behavior had not only anti-
competitive but predominantly pro-competitive effects.280  
 
Section 8 (c) serves as a “catch-all-provision” and involves all anti-
compatitive practices which are not covered by section 8 (d). Finally, 
section 9 prohibits price discrimination.  
 
 
                                                             
275 Sec. 8 (d) (iii). 
276 Sec. 8 (d) (iv). 
277 Sec. 8 (d) (v). 
278 Sec. 9. 
279 See Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd v National Association of Pharmaceutical 
Wholesalers 15/CAC/Feb02 par 51; Nationwide Poles v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd 72/CR/Dec03 
pars 79, 108; Sappi Fine Papers (Pty) Ltd v Commission 62/CR/Nov01 par 
41;Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 18/CR/Mar01 par 99. 
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6.2 Section 8 Competition Act and the essential facilities doctrine 
 
As the rulings of the ECJ which were analysed in chapter 4 of this 
thesis have shown, conflicts between intellectual property rights and 
competition law are mostly concerned with the question whether the 
refusal to grant a license is anti-competitive or not. Generally this situation 
is put on a level with a refusal to deal or sell and discussed in connection 
with the essential facilities doctrine.281  
 
As already discussed, this situation is regulated in section 8 of the 
Competition Act which partly corresponds with the European Art. 102 
TFEU. Section 8 Competition Act inter alia reads (emphasis added): 
 
“It is prohibited for a dominant firm to  
 (b) refuse to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is 
economically feasible to do so: 
 (d) engage in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm 
concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive, 
gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act: […] 
(ii) refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when 
supplying those goods is economically feasible. 
 
Thus, unlike many other jurisdictions, the South African competition 
law not only adopted the “essential facilities” doctrine, it even codified it in 
section 8 and defines an “essential facility” in section 1 of the Act as “an 
infrastructure or resource which cannot reasonably be duplicated and 
without access to which competitors cannot reasonably participate in the 
market”.  
 
                                                             
281 See for instance: Nagy, Csongor Istvan “Refusal to Deal and The Doctrine of Essential 
Facilities in US and EC Competition Law: A Comparative Perspective and Proposal for a 
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Refusing to give a competitor access to an essential facility is 
considered a per se contravention of the Act, and the only evidentiary 
requirement necessary to prove that a firm has been engaging in this 
conduct is the conduct itself. The doctrine therefore does not allow a 
dominant firm to raise an efficiency defence.282 Consequently, the 
Competition Tribunal argued in DW Integrators vs. SAS Institute283, that “a 
violation of section 8 (b) cannot be countervailed by efficiency gains. It is, 
in other words, per se illegal”. 
 
However, despite its explicit codification, the Competition Appeal 
Court (CAC) advised against over-expanding the scope of the essential 
facilities doctrine. CAC held that “the widening of the application and 
scope of the essential facilities doctrine can have harmful economic 
effects such as discouraging investment in infrastructure”.284 Furthermore, 
obliging a dominant firm to allow competitors access to a facility amounts 
to a considerable intervention. The scope of section 8(b) has therefore 
been limited to “traditional” infrastructure which comprises inter alia ports, 
airports, electricity power supply systems, telecommunication networks, 
railways, and pipelines. The CAC established five elements that must be 
alleged and proved by a complainant before the per se prohibition 
applies:285 
 
(i) the dominant firm involved must refuse to give the complainant 
access to an infrastructure or resource;  
(ii) the complainant and the dominant firm must be competitors;  
(iii) the infrastructure or resource concerned must not be capable of 
being reasonably duplicated;  
                                                             
282 Legh Robert an others Competition Law Sibergramme (2012) p. 3. 
283 DW Intergrators CC vs SAS Institute (Pty) Ltd 14/IR/Nov99. 
284 Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd & Others v National Association of Pharmaceutical  
Wholesalers & Others 15/CAC/Feb02 at [54]; Legh Robert an others Competition Law 
Sibergramme (2012) p. 3 available at: 
http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/Competition-Law-Sibergramme-
Issue-6-of-2012.pdf. 
285 Ibid. 
 
72 
 
(iv) the complainant must not be able to reasonably provide goods 
or services to its customers without access to the 
infrastructure or resource; and  
(v) it must be economically feasible for the dominant firm to provide 
its competitors with access to the infrastructure or resource.  
 
The CAC also emphasised that the term “resources” in the South 
African definition of an essential facility in section 1 does not include 
goods.286 This opinion stands in contrast with the EU´s definition of an 
essential facility.287 The CAC argues that there is a distinction between 
section 8 (b) which refers to the essential facility and does not include 
goods and section 8 (d) (ii) which in contrast refers to the refusal to supply 
scarce goods to a competitor. With this decision the CAC overruled the 
Tribunal's opinion that both provisions are only “two sides of the same 
coin”.288 In the same case that CAC also held that a “resource” also does 
not include services. Furthermore, there are doubts in the literature of 
whether the essential facilities prohibition will apply in respect of 
intellectual property rights or not.289 
 
 
6.3  Public interest provisions in the South African Competition Act 
 
South Africa´s Competition Act was drafted with the explicit aim to 
emphasize the importance of public interests. The Act therefore takes 
elements into considerations which cannot be found in EU or US 
competition law, and which strictly speaking go beyond the boundaries of 
                                                             
286 Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd v National Association of Pharmaceutical 
Wholesalers 15/CAC/Feb02 pars 51, 53. 
287 See Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin EU Competition Law (4th ed) (2011) 479 et seq. 
288 Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd v National Association of Pharmaceutical 
Wholesalers 15/CAC/Feb02 pars 50–52, 56. 
289 Opi, Baches, Sergio “The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual 
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Rights Still Sacrosanct?” (2001) Fordham Intellectual Property, Media 
and Entertainment Law Journal Vol XI Issue 2 Article 2 p. 419. 
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competition.290 Public interest takes an important role in the South African 
Competition Act. This is already evidenced by the fact that the Act’s 
objective to serve the public interest is already mentioned in the preamble 
of the Act 291 in the following way: 
 
“The people of South Africa recognise: That apartheid and other 
discriminatory laws and practices of the past resulted in excessive 
concentrations of ownership and control within the national economy, 
inadequate restraints against anti-competitive trade practices, and unjust 
restrictions on full and free participation in the economy by all South 
Africans. That the economy be open to greater ownership by a greater 
number of South Africans. That credible competition law, and effective 
structures to administer that law, are necessary for an efficient functioning 
economy. That an efficient, competitive economic environment, balancing 
the interests of workers, owners and consumers and focused on 
development will benefit all South Africans. In order to - provide all South 
Africans equal opportunity to participate fairly in the national economy; […] 
regulate the transfer of economic ownership in keeping with the public 
interest; […]”  
 
Furthermore, section 2 of the Act outlines the purpose of the South 
African Competition Act as the provision and maintenance of competition 
in order to achieve several goals. Some of them can be seen as not 
directly related to competition but to the public interest.292 For instance, 
section 2 emphasizes “the promotion of employment and advancement of 
the ‘social and economic welfare of South Africans’, expanding 
opportunities for South African companies in world markets, providing 
equitable opportunities for small and medium sized enterprises and to 
                                                             
290 Hodge, James and others “Public interest provisions in the South African Competition 
Act: A critical review” in: The development of competition law and economics of South 
Africa (2009) available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/10-year-
review/parallel-1b/Public-Interest-Provisions14-August-2009-2.docx. 
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promote a greater spread of ownership, particularly with respect to 
historically disadvantaged individuals.”293 These “soft” goals are recurring 
themes throughout the entire act. 
 
Finally, in section 12 (A) of the Act public interest in respect of 
mergers is addressed. The provision states that in addition to competition 
and efficiency considerations, it is also necessary to assess whether a 
merger ‘can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds by 
assessing the factors set out in subsection (3)’.294  
 
Subsection 12A(3) outlines and explains the factors that are 
considered as public interest grounds: “When determining whether a 
merger can or cannot be justified on public interest grounds, the 
Competition Commission or the Competition Tribunal must consider the 
effect that the merger will have on: 
 
a) a particular industrial sector or region 
b) employment 
c) the ability of small businesses or firms controlled or owned by 
historically disadvantaged persons to become competitive; 
d) the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets.” 
 
Therefore, the assessment of a merger is carried out with a two-
level test in South Africa. First of all, it is assessed, whether there is a 
“normal” infringement of competition law without consideration of the 
                                                             
293 Sec. 2 Competition Act; Hodge, James and others “Public interest provisions in the 
South African Competition Act: A critical review” in: The development of competition law 
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public interest thought, because the merger itself is already anti-
competitive. If this is not the case, then a second step is taken, in contrast 
to the European law, for example, to determine whether the merger has 
taken place in a manner directed against the public interest.295  
 
The introduction of the public interest element into the South African 
competition law is traced back in particular to the specific situation of 
South Africa after the end of the Apartheid regime. The objective of the 
regulations was, amongst others, to balance and take into consideration 
the suffered injustice as well as the suffered discrimination of the black 
and other population groups in South Africa.296 Furthermore, the argument 
is given, that public interest considerations make more sense in 
developing countries than in developed countries, although the specific 
needs of the developing countries cannot be fully considered solely with 
these regulations.297 
 
 
6.4 Section 10 (4) Competition Act  
 
The Competition Act states in section 3(1) that the Act’s provisions apply 
to all economic activity that has an effect in the Republic. This includes the 
exercise of intellectual property rights. 
 
However, section 10 (4) of the Act states regarding intellectual 
property that “[a] firm may apply to the Competition Commission to exempt 
from the application of this Chapter an agreement or practice, or 
                                                             
295 Boshoff, Willem and others “The Economics of Public Interest Provisions in South 
African Competition Policy” (2012) p. 8 available at: 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-Annual-Competition-Law-
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Neo “An Evaluation of the Influence of BEE on the Application of Competition Policy in 
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297 Ibid. 
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category of agreements or practices, that relates to the exercise of 
intellectual property rights, including a right acquired or protected in 
terms of the Performers’ Protection Act […]” [emphasis added].  
 
Such an exemption can be granted by the Competition Commission 
on request, if the agreement or practice constitutes an anticompetitive 
behavior according to Chapter 2 of the Competition Act and the 
anticompetitive behavior contributes to the following objectives: 
Maintenance or promotion of exports; Promotion of the competitiveness of 
small businesses or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons; changing the productive capacity to stop decline 
in an industry; maintaining economic stability in an industry designated by 
the Minister.298 However, it is very important to bear in mind that an 
exemption application will not automatically be granted.299 
 
 
6.5 Case Law 
 
Only very few cases regarding intellectual property rights and competition 
law have been decided and handled in South Africa by the competition 
authorities or courts in this regard.300 A lot of cases have only been 
investigated by the Commission and subsequently settled with the 
respondents, with the result that not all facts of the case have been put on 
the table, and the Commission had not decided on the merits.301 In 
addition, the Commission function in this cases is more that of an 
investigator, not a judge.302 In the very important case Hazel Tau & others 
                                                             
298 See sec. 10 Competition Act; The Competition Commission of South Africa: 
http://www.compcom.co.za/exemptions-2/ 
299 See also Hlatshawayo, Nkonzo, “The Challenges of IP Protection and Competition 
Enforcement: An Analysis of the Microsoft Decisions (US and EU) and their Implications 
for South African IP and Competition Law” (2008) p.13, available at: 
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2008_2/hlatshwayo. 
300 Ibid at p.12. 
301 Ibid. 
302 Ibid. 
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v. GlaxoSmithkline & Boehringer Ingelheim,303 for instance, AIDS activists 
brought this case before the Commission and alleged GlaxoSmithkline 
and Boehringer Ingelheim of abuse of market dominance by charging 
excessive prices for their AIDS drugs. Glaxo and Boeringer held several 
patents regarding four very important anti viral AIDS drugs.304 The 
Commission intended to refer this matter to the Competition Tribunal for 
adjudication because it had drawn the conclusion that both pharmaceutical 
companies had violated South African competition law by abusing their 
market dominant position by denying a competitor access to an essential 
facility; by charging excessive prices; and by engaging in exclusionary 
acts.305  
 
However, before the Tribunal was able to address the case, the 
Commission and the parties amicably reached a settlement agreement. In 
the course of this agreement Boeringer and Glaxo agreed to license local 
generic manufacturers to produce these drugs for the South African 
market.306 
  
Unfortunately, the Commissions analysis did not contain any 
reasoning why the Commission came to the conclusion that the 
defendant’s refusal to license competitors constituted a refusal to license 
an essential facility and therefore a contravention of the Competition Act. 
Therefore, this case does not provide a useful precedent.307 The same 
applies to the case Druggist Distributors (Pty) Ltd (DD) and the National 
Association of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers308 where the Competition 
Appeal Court (CAC) only held that the conduct complained did not fall 
                                                             
303 Competition Commission's Media Release No. 33 of 2003, 16 December 2003, 
accessible online at: http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/documents/MediaRelease.doc. 
304 Ibid; Hlatshawayo, Nkonzo, “The Challenges of IP Protection and Competition 
Enforcement: An Analysis of the Microsoft Decisions (US and EU) and their Implications 
for South African IP and Competition Law” (2008) p.14:  
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd v National Association of Pharmaceutical 
Wholesalers 15/CAC/Feb02. 
 
78 
 
within the scope of the essential facilities provision but probably 
constituted a refusal to supply a competitor with scarce goods or services.  
 
 
6.5.1 DW Integrators CC v. SAS Institute (Pty) Ltd 
 
In DW Integrators CC v SAS Institute309 (Pty), the claimant (DW 
Integrators) sued a major software firm (SAS Institute) that owned 
valuable intellectual property rights, mainly patents. The claimant itself 
was a company that provided consulting services to the license holders of 
the respondent’s software programmes.310 The DW Integrators applied for 
a court order obliging the defendant to issue a license to its intellectual 
property to the claimant. The claimant argued that the defendant’s 
intellectual property constituted an essential facility according to 
competition law and thus, the respondent’s refusal to grant a license to the 
claimant amounted to a violation of section 8(b) of the Competition Act.311 
However, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the claimant failed to 
properly define the relevant market. Therefore, the Tribunal unfortunately 
hat not to decide about the question whether competition law has been 
infringed or not. This especially marked a missed opportunity for the 
Tribunal to find whether intellectual property laws can constitute an 
essential facility according to competition law or not.312 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
309 DW Integrators CC v SAS Institute (Pty) Ltd [1999-2000] CPLR 191 (CT) 
310 Legh Robert an others Competition Law Sibergramme (2012) p. 3 available at: 
http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/Competition-Law-Sibergramme-
Issue-6-of-2012.pdf. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. 
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6.5.2 BMW v. Grandmark 
 
Most recently, in September 2013, the South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal decided in the appeal case of BMW v Grandmark.313 The Supreme 
Court was concerned with the following question: Can a car maker use 
registered designs (on spare parts) to stop others importing and selling so-
called ‘replacement parts’ which are cheaper, non-original spare parts? 
BMW, as the claimant, sued Grandmark, a replacement part provider, for 
design right infringement. Thus, the complaint mainly dealt with design 
right issues. However, in response to BMW´s claims the defendant 
counterclaimed, under section 31 of the Design Act, for revocation of the 
claimants design registrations. And in addition, most importantly, for the 
event that its claim for revocation failed the defendant asked for a court 
order referring the matter in dispute to the Competition Tribunal because 
then, according to the defendant, BMW would abuse a market dominant 
position. However, Judge Ranchod upheld the claim for revocation. It was 
therefore unnecessary for the court to adjudicate upon the question of 
referring the case to the Competition Tribunal.  
 
 
6.5.3 Conclusion 
 
Unfortunately the cases decided by South African courts remain unclear 
and do not present a useful precedent in many cases. For instance, it 
remains unanswered as to whether the essential facilities doctrine is 
applicable to intellectual property rights or not. It also remains unclear if 
others have a right to the grant of a compulsory license according to 
competition law in case a patent holder abuses a market dominant 
position. However, there is much to suggest that section 8 (b) which 
                                                             
313 Bayerische Motoren Werker Aktiengesellschaft v Grandmark International (Pty) Ltd 
and Another (722/12) [2013] ZASCA 114 (18 September 2013). 
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regulates the essential facilities doctrine also applies to intellectual 
property rights – not least because section 8 of the Competition Act partly 
corresponds with the European Art. 102 TFEU. To exclude intellectual 
property rights from the scope of section 8 (b) of the Competition Act 
would also mean to restrict effective options to combat anticompetitive 
behaviour by the exercise of intellectual property rights. In Europe, the 
essential facilities doctrine has shown that it is an appropriate tool for 
bringing intellectual property rights and competition law in line with each 
other. It would also be useful if the courts would define the scope of the 
essential facilities doctrine in each individual case, based on general 
principles. It seems for example not advisable to generally narrow the 
scope of the essential facilities doctrine to “traditional” and major 
infrastructure and to exclude goods and services beforehand as this has 
been practiced by the Competition Appeal Court.314 In contrast “leeway 
should be given to allow for the incorporation of equipment and intangible 
assets”, like patents and other intellectual property rights.315  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
At first sight, patent law and competition law are radically opposed to each 
other: Whereas patents grant monopolies or at least monopoly-like rights, 
competition law attempts to prevent and fight monopolies. This conflict has 
been ostensibly intensified thanks to modern technologies and the growing 
importance of patent rights in industrialised nations.  
 
At closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that both laws have 
the same objective: promoting competition. The competition law acts 
                                                             
314 Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd & Others v National Association of Pharmaceutical  
Wholesalers & Others 15/CAC/Feb02 at [54]. 
315 Legh Robert an others Competition Law Sibergramme (2012) p. 3 available at: 
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rather reactively, by allowing the competition on the market until a market 
participant has, for instance, abused his acquired market power in a 
competition-constricting manner at the expense of other market 
participants. In other words: Competition law cleans the market of anti-
competitive agreements and practices. 
 
Patent law, on the other hand, starts earlier, by creating proactively 
an incentive for companies to invest in new technologies and thus to enter 
into technological competition. Thus, the patent law is pro-competitive.316 
As already illustrated in this thesis, leading patent right theories are based 
on the idea of promotion of competition and innovation.However, it can be 
noted that both patent law and competition law are not inevitably pro-
competitive without any limitations. An excess of competition law or 
exclusive patent rights turns the pro-competitive effect into the opposite. 
 
The challenge when dealing with both legal institutions is to create 
a balance between patent law and competition law in the line of a 
“practical concordance.” If one is to take the objective of both legal 
institutes, namely, the promotion of competition, as a basis, then the 
exercise of patent rights can be tolerated as long as the pro-competitive 
effect is dominant and the pro-competitive patterns of competition law are 
not repelled at the expense of competition. The same applies vice-versa to 
competition law. Both legal institutions can therefore be imagined as two 
scale pans with a maximally pro-competitive effect in a balanced state. As 
soon as the scales lose their equilibrium, the anticompetitive effect will 
prevail.  
 
The patent infringement cases show how difficult it can be to reach 
the desired equilibrium in cases in which the claimant takes action against 
                                                             
316 See also the Competition Tribunal South Africa, National Association of 
Pharmaceutical Wholesalers and others v. Glaxo Wellcome and others, Case: 68/IR/JUN 
00 para. 101: “competition is not diminished by patent protection – indeed, it is 
competition in order to achieve patent protection in respect of a new innovation.” 
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the defendant regarding a standard-relevant patent. The FRAND objection 
is a suitable means here to meet abuse of a market-dominant position 
through patents. However, it requires that the obstacles for a successful 
rise of the FRAND objection in court are not too high. On the other hand, 
the legitimate interests of the patent holder must also be sufficiently 
considered. 
 
The German approach of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) laid 
down in its Orange-Book standard decision is too rigid. It prefers the 
patent owner because the Courts very strict procedural requirements have 
the consequence that it is nearly impossible in practice to successfully 
raise the FRAND defence. Since this thesis has shown that the exercise of 
standard relevant patents can be anticompetitive by constituting an abuse 
of a market-dominant position it is important to better protect other market 
participants. Therefore it is crucial that excessive formal and procedural 
hurdles regarding the use of the FRAND objection are abolished. Of 
course, this cannot mean that whenever a patent confers a dominant 
position on the holder, this has to be under the obligation to grant a license 
to anyone who is willing to pay royalties.317 It also goes too far to allow the 
FRAND defence in patent infringement proceedings just because the 
respondent and patent infringer shows a “willingness to negotiate 
royalties”, expressed in whatever manner. Both would exceedingly reduce 
and limit the patent holders’ right.  
 
Thus, a compromise is suggested here. The solution of the German 
Federal Court of Justice certainly makes sense and should, in principle, be 
retained. However, a constraint would be meaningful so the license seeker 
can at least make a license offer under the condition that its products fall 
within the scope of the patent owner’s standard essential patent. In 
addition, the license seeker should be allowed the reservation that he is 
                                                             
317 Korah, Valentine Competition Law of the European Community (2001) 2nd Ed. Vol. 1 p. 
3-40. 
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committed to a license payment only if the patent is valid and in force.318 
Finally, it would be desirable if the license seeker is allowed to make a late 
license offer even during patent infringement proceedings. This would be 
appropriate in those cases in which the patent infringer and license seeker 
can show credibly that he was not informed sufficiently about the patent 
right situation before the proceedings.  
 
It remains to be seen what the decision of the European Court of 
Justice will look like. Due to the current and still very inhomogeneous legal 
practice in Europe concerning this question a clear decision of the 
European Court of Justice will definitely be an important step forward 
towards increased uniformity and legal certainty in Europe. 
 
Like in the EU, the South African Competition Act keeps 
prohibitions on anti-competitive practices at hand, which are applicable to 
intellectual property law. Like in the EU, there is no reason why the 
Competition Act could not recognise certain practices related to the 
execution and enforcement of patents as anti-competitive and provide a 
basis for issuing compulsory licences.319 As a consequence, there is also 
no obvious reason why a FRAND objection should not be allowed in South 
African courts under the same or similar conditions. 
 
However, attention should be paid that in threshold and developing 
countries the abuse of a market dominant position, as an anticompetitive 
behaviour, often causes more damage to the economy than it is the case 
in developed nations. This applies particularly to states, in which there are 
small and poorer markets.320 The reason for it, amongst others, is that big, 
multinational companies have less difficulties to spread in small and weak 
markets and to establish a corresponding market power there.  
                                                             
318 See Verhauwen, Axel “Goldener Orange-Book-Standard am Ende?“ (Is the golden 
Orange Book Standard at the end“) (2013) GRUR p. 553 et. seq. 
319 Ibid. 
320  Brusick, Philippe, Evenett, Simon “Should developing countries worry about the abuse 
of dominant power?” (2008) Wisconsin Law Review p. 269. 
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Another problem in developing countries is that dominant 
companies are in the hands of the state and smaller and midsize 
companies are facing problems to hold their ground on the market.321 In 
the end, the competition law authorities in developing countries very often 
have insufficient personnel, which hinders the fight against anti-
competitive behaviour, especially if it is caused by the state itself.322 
Therefore, it makes sense to give higher importance to competition law in 
developing countries. An important role could play the consideration of 
public interest here. However, one of the most fundamental arguments 
against the introduction of public interest provisions alongside traditional 
competition law objectives are that this will “pull competition law in an 
opposite direction to that of the traditional objectives” and that this causes 
much uncertainty and extensive balancing.323 This applies all the more as 
there is already a lot of uncertainty concerning the application of the 
FRAND objection and the question when exactly royalties are fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). It is therefore advisable to 
think about a regulation of the FRAND objection by law as an additional 
means for the prevention of an abuse of a market dominant position. In the 
South African context it furthermore seems to be appropriate to resort to 
the European Commission’s less stringent requirements instead of 
resorting to the German Orange Book Standard criteria. This would mean 
to allow the FRAND objection in South Africa already under the conditions 
that the patent holder abuses a market dominant position by holding a so 
called standard essential patent and that, in addition, the defendant shows 
a willingness to negotiate with the patent holder about the grant of a 
license. At least it should be kept in mind that the abuse of a market 
dominant position is particularly damaging for developing countries. This 
                                                             
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Teague, Iam Graeme The role of the public interest in competition law: a consideration 
of the public interest in merger control and exemptions in South Africa and how the public 
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will mean, in some cases, to give precedence to the competition law at the 
expense of patents. In Europe, however, the focus should clearly be on an 
effective competition without undermining strong patent protection. This is 
particularly important for industrialized nations like Germany because 
patent protection is of great importance for many key industries there.  
 
In the end, the equilibrium between competition law and intellectual 
property rights will always remain a balancing act, which must be 
answered differently from one legal system to another and from one 
national economy to another. However, this thesis has shown that both 
legal institutes essentially follow the same objective. Thus, the role of 
intellectual property rights in our modern world can be summarized with 
the words of Justice Kozinski: “Overprotecting IP is harmful as under-
protecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing 
today […] is genuinely new […] Overprotection stifles the very creative 
force it is meant to nurture.”324  
                                                             
324 White vs. Samsung Electronics America Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), available 
at: https://www2.bc.edu/~yen/Torts/Vanna%20White%20Koz%20ed.pdf. 
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